Analysis 72 (2):314-316 (2012)

Authors
Rachael Briggs
Australian National University
Daniel Nolan
University of Notre Dame
Abstract
Tracking accounts of knowledge formulated in terms of counterfactuals suffer from well known problems. Examples are provided, and it is shown that moving to a dispositional tracking theory of knowledge avoids three of these problems
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DOI 10.1093/analys/ans049
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Modal Fictionalism and Possible-Worlds Discourse.David Liggins - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (2):151-60.
Why Modal Fictionalism is Not Self-Defeating.Richard Woodward - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (2):273 - 288.

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