Dialectica 63 (3):325-332 (2009)
Nishi Shah has argued that the norm of truth is a prescriptive norm which regulates doxastic deliberation. Also, the acceptance of the norm of truth explains why belief is subject to norms of evidence. Steglich-Petersen pointed out that the norm of truth cannot be prescriptive because it cannot be broken deliberatively. More recently, Pascal Engel suggested that both the norms of truth and evidence are deliberately violated in cases of epistemic akrasia. The akratic agent accepts these norms but in some cases he is not motivated by them. In this paper I will argue that Shah cannot use Engel's suggestion because, given his definition of doxastic deliberation, epistemic akrasia is impossible in the context of deliberation about belief. Furthermore, epistemic akrasia is in conflict with the phenomenon of doxastic transparency that Shah tries to explain.
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
The Truth Norm and Guidance: A Reply to Gluer and Wikforss.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2010 - Mind 119 (475):749-755.
Leaps of Knowledge.Andrew Reisner - 2013 - In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-183.
Voluntarism and Transparent Deliberation.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2006 - South African Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):171-176.
Does Doxastic Transparency Support Evidentialism?Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (4):541-547.
Added to index2009-09-18
Total downloads110 ( #44,295 of 2,158,385 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #133,350 of 2,158,385 )
How can I increase my downloads?