- Implicit Attitudes Are (Probably) Beliefs.Joseph Bendana - forthcoming - In Dirk Kindermann, Andrea Onofri & Cristina Borgoni (eds.), The Fragmented Mind. Oxford, UK: pp. 1-377.details
- The Fragmentation of Belief.Joseph Bendana & Eric Mandelbaum - forthcoming - In Cristina Borgoni, Dirk Kindermann & Andrea Onofri (eds.), The Fragmented Mind. Oxford, UK:details
- I Hear You Feel Confident.Adam Michael Bricker - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.details
- A Puzzle About Imagining Believing.Alon Chasid - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.details
- Inquiring Minds Want to Improve.Arianna Falbo - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
- Credal Sensitivism: Threshold Vs. Credence-One.Jie Gao - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
- Rational Agency and the Struggle to Believe What Your Reasons Dictate.Brie Gertler - forthcoming - In Cristina Borgoni, Dirk Kindermann & Andrea Onofri (eds.), The Fragmented Mind. Oxford University Press.details
- Epistemic Akrasia and Belief‐Credence Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson & Peter Tan - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
- Understanding Implicit Bias: A Case for Regulative Dispositionalism.Annemarie Kalis & Harmen Ghijsen - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology:1-22.details
- Neuroexistentialism, Eudaimonics, and Positive Illusions.Timothy Lane & Owen Flanagan - forthcoming - In Byron Kaldis (ed.), Mind and Society: Cognitive Science Meets the Philosophy of the Social Sciences. SYNTHESE Philosophy Library Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, & Philosophy of Science. Springer Science+Business.details
- Belief and Settledness.Wooram Lee - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
- The Science of Belief: A Progress Report.Nicolas Porot & Eric Mandelbaum - forthcoming - WIREs Cognitive Science 1.details
- A Puzzle About Belief-About.Alex Rausch - forthcoming - Mind.details
- 2010: Belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
- Blind Rule-Following and the Regress of Motivations.Zachary Mitchell Swindlehurst - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-14.details
- The Story of the Ghost in the Machine.Adam Toon - forthcoming - In Sonia Sedivy (ed.), Art, Representation and Make-Believe: Essays on the Philosophy of Kendall L. Walton. New York, NY, USA:details
- De Se Thought and Communication: An Introduction.Stephan Torre - forthcoming - In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Stephan Torre (eds.), About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-21.details
- Ways to Knowledge-First Believe.Simon Wimmer - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-17.details
- The Limits of the Doxastic.Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas - 2022 - In Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 36-57.details
- Belief in Character Studies.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (1):27-42.details
- Degrees of Acceptance.Alexander Dinges - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly (3):578-594.details
- A Tribal Mind: Beliefs That Signal Group Identity or Commitment.Eric Funkhouser - 2022 - Mind and Language 37 (3):444-464.details
- On Believing: Being Right in a World of Possibilities.David Hunter - 2022 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
- Creencias conspirativas. Aspectos formales y generales de un fenómeno antiguo (Conspiracy beliefs. Formal and general aspects of an ancient phenomenon).Pietro Montanari - 2022 - Protrepsis 11 (22):273-304.details
- The Limited Phenomenal Infallibility Thesis.Christopher Stratman - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
- Talking About: An Intentionalist Theory of Reference.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2022 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
- Two Concepts of Belief Strength: Epistemic Confidence and Identity Centrality.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13:1-4.details
- The Limits of Partial Doxasticism.Facundo M. Alonso - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly (2):326-345.details
- The Aim of Belief and Suspended Belief.C. J. Atkinson - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (4):581-606.details
- A Faithful Response to Disagreement.Lara Buchak - 2021 - The Philosophical Review 130 (2):191-226.details
- Belief-Like Imagining and Correctness.Alon Chasid - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2):147-160.details
- How Can Belief Be Akratic?Eugene Chislenko - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13925-13948.details
- Interpretivism without judgement-dependence.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (2):611-615.details
- How Beliefs Are Like Colors.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7889-7918.details
- The Relation Between Degrees of Belief and Binary Beliefs: A General Impossibility Theorem.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2021 - In Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief. Essays on the Lottery Paradox. Cambridge University Press. pp. 223-54.details
- Beliefs Don’T Simplify Our Reasoning, Credences Do.Alexander Dinges - 2021 - Analysis 81 (2):199-207.details
- Belief Attribution as Indirect Communication.Christopher Gauker - 2021 - In Ladislav Koreň, Hans Bernhard Schmid, Preston Stovall & Leo Townsend (eds.), Groups, Norms and Practices: Essays on Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality. Springer Nature Switzerland. pp. 173-187.details
- Rules of Belief and the Normativity of Intentional Content.Derek Green - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (2):159-69.details
- Does "Think" Mean the Same Thing as "Believe"? Linguistic Insights Into Religious Cognition.Larisa Heiphetz, Casey Landers & Neil Van Leeuwen - 2021 - Psychology of Religion and Spirituality 13 (3):287-297.details
- How Reasoning Aims at Truth.David Horst - 2021 - Noûs 55 (1):221-241.details
- Belief, Inference, and the Self-Conscious Mind.Eric Marcus - 2021 - Oxford University Press.details
- Nietzsche's Intuitions.Justin Remhof - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (7):732-753.details
- The Pragmatic Metaphysics of Belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2021 - In The Fragmented Mind. New York, NY, USA: pp. 350-375.details
- Imagining stories: attitudes and operators.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):639-664.details
- Belief Does Not Entail a Reasoning Disposition.Simon Wimmer - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14975-14991.details
- Knowledge-First Believing the Unknowable.Simon Wimmer - 2021 - Synthese 198 (4):3855-3871.details
- The 'Unified' Background.Ilexa Yardley - 2021 - Https://Medium.Com/the-Circular-Theory.details
- Deeply Disagreeing with Myself: Synchronic Intrapersonal Deep Disagreements.Patrick Bondy - 2020 - Topoi 40 (5):1225-1236.details
- The Neural and Cognitive Mechanisms of Knowledge Attribution: An EEG Study.Adam Michael Bricker - 2020 - Cognition 203:104412.details
- Как верить преданно и твердо? (How to Believe Faithfully and Firmly?).Pavel Butakov - 2020 - Philosophy. Journal of the Higher School of Economics 4 (4):167-184.details
|
Off-campus access
Using PhilPapers from home?
Create an account to enable off-campus access through your institution's proxy server.
Monitor this page
Be alerted of all new items appearing on this page. Choose how you want to monitor it:
Email
|
RSS feed
|
|