Edited by Rima Basu (Claremont McKenna College)
|Summary||What distinguishes belief from other states of mind? There are, on the one hand, other information-bearing states of mind, such as perceptual experience or sub-personal cognitive states, that seem to fall short of belief. On the other hand, there are other types of propositional attitudes, notably desire, intention, fear and conjecture, that need to be distinguished from belief. Is the ability to have beliefs essentially connected with rationality, having some other propositional attitudes, the ability to act and the possession of language?|
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