Perceptual objectivity

Philosophical Review 118 (3):285-324 (2009)
Authors
Tyler Burge
University of California, Los Angeles
Abstract
A central preoccupation of philosophy in the twentieth century was to determine constitutive conditions under which accurate (objective) empirical representation of the macrophysical environment is possible. A view that dominated attitudes on this project maintained that an individual cannot empirically represent a physical subject matter as having specific physical characteristics unless the individual can represent some constitutive conditions under which such representation is possible. The version of this view that dominated the century's second half maintained that objective empirical representation of the physical environment requires the individual to be able to supplement this representation with representation of general constitutive features of objectivity. This essay criticizes instances of this version in P. F. Strawson and Quine. It maintains that all versions of the position postulate conditions on objective empirical representation that are more intellectual than are warranted. Such views leave it doubtful that animals and human infants perceptually represent elements in the physical environment. By appeal to common sense and to empirical perceptual psychology, this essay argues that unaided perception yields objective representation of the macrophysical environment. It does so in prelinguistic animals, even in animals that almost surely lack propositional attitudes. The essay concludes with explications of nondeflationary conceptions of representation and perception. It distinguishes nonperceptual sensing from perceptual representation and explicates perceptual representation as a type of objective sensory representation. Objectivity is marked by perceptual constancies. Representation is marked by a nontrivial role for veridicality conditions in explanations of the relevant states. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us Digg Reddit Technorati What's this?
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1215/00318108-2009-001
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 35,898
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Attention and Mental Paint1.Ned Block - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):23-63.
The Grain of Vision and the Grain of Attention.Ned Block - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):170-184.
The Defective Armchair: A Reply to Tye.Ned Block - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):159-165.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Perceptual Representation.Michael J. Pendlebury - 1986 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87:91-106.
The Silence of the Senses.Charles S. Travis - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):57-94.
Perception and Representation.William P. Alston - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):253-289.
Disjunctivism and Perceptual Psychology.Tyler Burge - 2005 - Philosophical Topics 33 (1):1-78.
Motor Intentionality and its Primordiality.Jennifer Hudin - 2006 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 49 (6):573 – 590.
Kant on Animal Consciousness.Colin McLear - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-07-19

Total downloads
587 ( #4,345 of 2,293,848 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #48,736 of 2,293,848 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature