Studia Logica 88 (1):157-194 (2008)

Authors
John Cantwell
Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm
Abstract
It is argued that indicative conditionals are best viewed as having truth conditions (and so they are in part factual) but that these truth conditions are ‘gappy’ which leaves an explanatory gap that can only be filled by epistemic considerations (and so indicative conditionals are in part epistemic). This dual nature of indicative conditionals gives reason to rethink the relationship between logic viewed as a descriptive discipline (focusing on semantics) and logic viewed as a discipline with a normative import (focusing on epistemic notions such as ‘reasoning’, ‘beliefs’ and ‘assumptions’). In particular, it is argued that the development of formal models for epistemic states can serve as a starting point for exploring logic when viewed as a normative discipline.
Keywords Philosophy   Computational Linguistics   Mathematical Logic and Foundations   Logic
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11225-008-9096-7
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 65,579
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

On Conditionals.Dorothy Edgington - 1995 - Mind 104 (414):235-329.

View all 34 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

What We Can Learn From How Trivalent Conditionals Avoid Triviality.Daniel Lassiter - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (9-10):1087-1114.
Changing the Modal Context.John Cantwell - 2008 - Theoria 74 (4):331-351.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Wondering What Might Be.Moritz Schulz - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):367 - 386.
Realizing What Might Be.Malte Willer - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (3):365 - 375.
Modalised Conditionals: A Response to Willer.Moritz Schulz - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):673-682.
Subjunctive Biscuit and Stand-Off Conditionals.Eric Swanson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):637-648.
The Paradox of Indicative Conditionals.D. K. Johnston - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 83 (1):93 - 112.
Indicative and Subjunctive Conditionals.Brian Weatherson - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):200-216.
Conditional Preferences and Practical Conditionals.Nate Charlow - 2013 - Linguistics and Philosophy 36 (6):463-511.
Why Hypothetical Syllogism is Invalid for Indicative Conditionals.Moti Mizrahi - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):40-43.
The Logic of Indicative Conditionals.Chhanda Chakraborti - 1995 - Dissertation, The University of Utah
Conditional Truth and Future Reference.Stefan Kaufmann - 2005 - Journal of Semantics 22 (3):231-280.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
105 ( #105,712 of 2,461,812 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #448,803 of 2,461,812 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes