Actuality and knowability

Analysis 71 (3):411-419 (2011)
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Abstract

It is widely believed that for all p, or at least for all entertainable p, it is knowable a priori that (p iff actually p). It is even more widely believed that for all such p, it is knowable that (p iff actually p). There is a simple argument against these claims from four antecedently plausible premises.

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David Chalmers
New York University

References found in this work

Two notions of necessity.Martin Davies & Lloyd Humberstone - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 38 (1):1-31.
A logical analysis of some value concepts.Frederic Fitch - 1963 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 28 (2):135-142.
The paradox of knowability.Dorothy Edgington - 1985 - Mind 94 (376):557-568.

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