Parity: An Intuitive Case

Ratio 29 (4):395-411 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In other work I have argued that items can be on a par, where being on a par is a fourth, basic, sui generis value relation beyond the usual trichotomy of ‘better than’, ‘worse than’, and ‘equally good’. In this paper, I aim to marshal non-technical, intuitive arguments for this view. First, I try to cast doubt on the leading source of intuitive resistance to parity, the conviction that if two items are comparable, one must be better than the other, worse than it, or they must be equally good. Second, I explain how parity can arise by appealing to an uncontroversial distinction between quantity and quality of value. I propose both sufficient conditions for parity and a nontechnical model of the notion. My overall aim is to bring into view a simple and intuitive picture of value – and more generally of normativity – in which parity plays a significant role.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,069

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Parity, interval value, and choice.Ruth Chang - 2005 - Ethics 115 (2):331-350.
The possibility of parity.Ruth Chang - 2002 - Ethics 112 (4):659-688.
Parity demystified.Erik Carlson - 2010 - Theoria 76 (2):119-128.
Superhard Choices.Miguel F. Dos Santos - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (2):248-265.
Parity, incomparability and rationally justified choice.Martijn Boot - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (1):75 - 92.
Parity, Preference and Puzzlement.Joshua Gert - 2015 - Theoria 81 (3):249-271.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-11-10

Downloads
176 (#114,629)

6 months
19 (#144,815)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Ruth Chang
Oxford University

Citations of this work

Dimensions of Value.Brian Hedden & Daniel Muñoz - 2024 - Noûs 58 (2):291-305.
Hard Choices.Ruth Chang - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (1):1-21.
Hyperintensionality and Normativity.Federico L. G. Faroldi - 2019 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.
Value pluralism.Elinor Mason - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Value and parity.Joshua Gert - 2004 - Ethics 114 (3):492-510.
Parity demystified.Erik Carlson - 2010 - Theoria 76 (2):119-128.
Parity, Comparability, and Choice.Chrisoula Andreou - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (1):5-22.

Add more references