The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief

In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press (2002)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Experiences and beliefs are different sorts of mental states, and are often taken to belong to very different domains. Experiences are paradigmatically phenomenal, characterized by what it is like to have them. Beliefs are paradigmatically intentional, characterized by their propositional content. But there are a number of crucial points where these domains intersect. One central locus of intersection arises from the existence of phenomenal beliefs: beliefs that are about experiences

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,891

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief.David Chalmers - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 220--72.
Beliefs as Self-Verifying Fictions.Angela Mendelovici - forthcoming - In Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Jong (eds.), What is Belief? Oxford University Press.
Unconscious Belief and Conscious Thought.Tim Crane - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. , US: Oxford University Press. pp. 156-173.
Belief and consciousness.Sara Worley - 1997 - Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):41-55.
The epistemology of spirit beliefs.Hans Van Eyghen - 2023 - New York, NY: Routledge.
Secondary belief content, what is it good for?Alexander Sandgren - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1467-1476.
The ins and outs of conscious belief.Sam Coleman - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):517-548.
Implicit Bias and Qualiefs.Martina Fürst - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-34.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
0

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

David Chalmers
New York University

Citations of this work

Physicalism and phenomenal concepts.Daniel Stoljar - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):296-302.
Introspection.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Mental Graphs.James Pryor - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):309-341.
Factive phenomenal characters.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.
Epistemological Problems of Perception.Jack Lyons - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references