Failed-Art and Failed Art-Theory

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):381-400 (2010)
Abstract
An object being non-art appears only trivially informative. Some non-art objects, however, could be saliently 'almost' art, and therefore objects for which being non-art is non-trivially informative. I call these kinds of non-art objects 'failed-art' objects—non-art objects aetiologically similar to art-objects, diverging only in virtue of some relevant failure. I take failed-art to be the right sort of thing, to result from the right sort of action, and to have the right sort of history required to be art, but to be non-art by having failure where being art requires success. I assume that for something to be art that thing must be the product of intention-directed action. I then offer an account of attempts that captures the success conditions governing the relationship between intention-directed actions and their products. From this, I claim that to be failed-art is to be the product of a failed art-attempt, i.e., to be non-art as the result of the particular way in which that art-attempt failed. An art-attempt I take to be an attempt with success conditions, that, if satisfied, entail the satisfaction of the conditions for being art—whatever those may be. To be art, then, is to be the product of a successful art-attempt. As such, any art theory incompatible with my account of failed-art is an art theory for which the notions of success and failure do not matter, and therefore an art theory for which being art needn't be substantively intention-dependent. So, any theory of art unable to accommodate my account of failed-art is _ipso facto_ false
Keywords Art  Intentions  Definition  Failure  Attempts  Artwork
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00048400903194559
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.
The Possibility of Practical Reason.David Velleman - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
On Action.Carl Ginet - 1990 - Cambridge University Press.
The Compositionality Papers.Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore - 2002 - Oxford University Press.

View all 27 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
The New Aestheticism.John J. Joughin & Simon Malpas (eds.) - 2003 - Manchester University Press.
Misappropriation of Our Musical Past.Theodore Gracyk - 2011 - Journal of Aesthetic Education 45 (3):50-66.
Photographic Art: An Ontology Fit to Print.Christy Mag Uidhir - 2012 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 70 (1):31-42.
Moral Development: A Reply to Richmond and Cummings.David Carr * - 2004 - Journal of Moral Education 33 (2):207-210.
Art, Self, and Knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Added to PP index
2009-07-26

Total downloads
121 ( #42,049 of 2,202,780 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
15 ( #13,275 of 2,202,780 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature