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About this topic
Summary Determinism is a claim about the laws of nature. Events are determined if the laws of nature, together with the total set of facts prevailing at a moment in time, are sufficient to settle precisely what happens at the next and each subsequent moment of time. Determinism thus rules out chanciness in a central sense of that word. The free will debate has been centrally concerned with whether determinism is incompatible with freedom: many philosophers worry that if how agents act is always settled prior to their action (settled even prior to their birth) than we lack free will.
Key works The key works on the compatibility question are more or less coextensive with the key works on free will, since the first issue has been so central to the second. I shall not list those works here. Important papers that explore the nature of determinism itself as it pertains to free will includeBerofsky 1971; the two volumes of Honderich 1988 and Earman 2004.
Introductions Honderich 1973;Kane 2002
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556 found
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  1. added 2019-01-17
    Paul Russell, The Limits of Free Will: Selected Essays. [REVIEW]Lorenzo Greco - 2018 - Rivista di Filosofia 109 (3):519-521.
  2. added 2019-01-15
    Stumping Freedom: Divine Causality and the Will.James Dominic Rooney, Op - 2015 - New Blackfriars 96 (1066):711-722.
    The problems with grace and free will have prompted long-standing theological conflicts, chiefly revolving around certain disagreements over the nature of divine causality in respect to the free will's of creatures and His foreknowledge of free acts. Eleonore Stump offers a new interpretation of divine action on the will that holds God only acts by way of formal causality and that human cooperation with grace is only by way of "quiescence." I argue that this account lacks coherence in certain important (...)
  3. added 2018-11-13
    Using Conway’s Game of Life to Teach Free Will.Galen Barry - 2018 - Teaching Philosophy 41 (4):337-347.
    The concept of determinism proves to be a persistent stumbling block to student comprehension of issues surrounding free will. Students tend to commit two main errors. First, they often confuse determinism with the related but importantly different idea of fatalism. Second, students often do not adequately understand that mental states, such as desires or beliefs, can function as deterministic causes. This paper outlines a straightforward in-class exercise modeled after John Horton Conway’s “Game of Life” computer simulation. The exercise aims to (...)
  4. added 2018-11-07
    One World or Many? Poppoer's Three World Theory and the Problem of Scientific Determinism.Brian Baigrie - unknown - Eidos: The Canadian Graduate Journal of Philosophy 3.
  5. added 2018-11-02
    Genetic Determinism, Neuronal Determinism, and Determinism Tout Court.Bernard Baertschi & Alexandre Mauron - 2011 - In Judy Illes & Barbara J. Sahakian (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 151.
    This article analyses neuronal determinism and mentions that at first sight it appears to be a type of qualified determinism. Neurodeterminism is better conceived as determinism tout court when it is applied to human beings. It differs importantly from genetic determinism, together the two views that are often regarded as similar in form if not in content. Moreover, the article examines the question of genetic determinism, because it is a paradigm of qualified determinism. It then explains the meaning of determinism (...)
  6. added 2018-10-29
    Determinismo E Complessitáa.F. T. Arecchi - 2000
  7. added 2018-10-29
    Freedom and Determinism in Indian Thought.J. P. Atreya - 1974 - Proceedings of the XVth World Congress of Philosophy 4:289-291.
  8. added 2018-09-23
    Justification and Determinism: An Exchange.M. Bernstein - 1988 - The Monist 71 (3):358-376.
  9. added 2018-09-21
    (In)Compatibilism.Kristin M. Mickelson - forthcoming - In Joseph Campbell (ed.), Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Free Will.
    This chapter offers the reader some useful tools for identifying and assessing the distinct views and debates currently associated with the terms ‘compatibilism’ and ‘incompatibilism’. It begins with a discussion of the two relata of free-will (in)compatibilism, namely the free-will relatum (§2) and the determinism relatum (§3). The next section (§4) provides an overview of five relations which are commonly said to hold (or not hold) between these relata: conceptual (in)compatibility, logical (in)compatibility, logical (in)consistency, metaphysical (in)compatibility, and metaphysical (in)compossibility. In (...)
  10. added 2018-09-16
    “Free Will and Affirmation: Assessing Honderich’s Third Way”.Paul Russell - 2017 - In Gregg D. Caruso (ed.), Ted Honderich on Consciousness, Determinism, and Humanity. London, UK: Palgrave. pp. Pp. 159-79..
    In the third and final part of his A Theory of Determinism (TD) Ted Honderich addresses the fundamental question concerning “the consequences of determinism.” The critical question he aims to answer is what follows if determinism is true? This question is, of course, intimately bound up with the problem of free will and, in particular, with the question of whether or not the truth of determinism is compatible or incompatible with the sort of freedom required for moral responsibility. It is (...)
  11. added 2018-08-26
    Bodies, Predicates, and Fated Truths: Ontological Distinctions and the Terminology of Causation in Defenses of Stoic Determinism by Chrysippus and Seneca.Jula Wildberger - 2013 - In Francesca Guadelupe Masi & Stefano Maso (eds.), Fate, Chance, Fortune in Ancient Thought. Amsterdam: Hakkert. pp. 103-123.
    Reconstructs the original Greek version of the confatalia-argument that Cicero attributes to Chrysippus in De fato and misrepresent in crucial ways. Compares this argument with Seneca's discussion of determinism in the Naturales quaestiones. Clarifies that Seneca makes a different distinction from that attested in Cicero's De fato. Argues that problems with interpreting both accounts derive from disregarding terminological distinctions harder to spot in the Latin versions and, related to this, insufficient attention to the ontological distinction between bodies (such as Fate) (...)
  12. added 2018-08-26
    Delimiting a Self by God in Epictetus.Jula Wildberger - 2013 - In Jörg Rüpke & Greg Woolf (eds.), Religious Dimensions of the Self in the Second Century CE. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. pp. 23-45.
    Epictetus' thought is defined by an antithesis of mine and not-mine, which is an antithesis of externals and self. From this arise a number of questions for Epictetus‘ theology, which are addressed in this paper: How is the self delimited from God, given that God is all-pervading? Is God inside or outside the self? In which way is God the cause, creator and shaper of the self? And how does human agency and self-shaping through prohairesis spell out within this determinst (...)
  13. added 2018-08-20
    Laws of Nature and Free Will.Pedro Merlussi - 2017 - Dissertation, Durham University
    This thesis investigates the conceptual relationship between laws of nature and free will. In order to clarify the discussion, I begin by distinguishing several questions with respect to the nature of a law: i) do the laws of nature cover everything that happens? ii) are they deterministic? iii) can there be exceptions to universal and deterministic laws? iv) do the laws of nature govern everything in the world? In order to answer these questions I look at three widely endorsed accounts (...)
  14. added 2018-08-20
    Determinism, compatibilism and free will scepticism.Rafael Miranda-Rojas - 2017 - Cinta de Moebio 60:295-305.
    Resumen: El presente escrito tiene por objetivo discutir los alcances de la postura denominada escepticismo sobre el libre albedrío y evaluar si el debate compatibilismo - incompatibilismo supone una postura racionalista y/o necesitarista respecto a si un sujeto S actúa libremente. La discusión de los últimos diez años sobre este tópico permite establecer una distinción relevante entre que una acción sea libre, sin que ello descarte antecedentes causales de esa acción. En particular, sin que ello conduzca a un compromiso con (...)
  15. added 2018-08-20
    Determinism, Free Will, and Moral Responsbility.Paul Appiah-Sekyere - 2013 - Philosophy Study 3 (11).
    Human beings live amidst several bonds. These bonds often place both internal and external limitations that apparently create the view that a human being has no free will but is determined. This paper explores the controversial issue whether a human being possesses free will to make free choices or is determined. It is the stance of this study that if one does not have free will then one cannot be morally responsible for one’s actions and consequently praise and blame would (...)
  16. added 2018-08-04
    The Problem of Free Will and Determinism: An Abductive Approach.Kristin M. Mickelson - forthcoming - Social Philosophy and Policy 36 (1).
    This essay begins by dividing the traditional problem of free will and determinism into a “correlation” problem and an “explanation” problem. I then focus on the explanation problem, and argue that a standard form of abductive (i.e. inference to the best-explanation) reasoning may be useful in solving it. To demonstrate the fruitfulness of the abductive approach, I apply it to three standard accounts of free will. While each account implies the same solution to the correlation problem, each implies a unique (...)
  17. added 2018-08-03
    X.Kristin M. Mickelson - manuscript
  18. added 2018-08-02
    Contemporary Concepts of Time and the Idea of God. [REVIEW]E. M. A. - 1935 - Journal of Philosophy 32 (12):335-335.
  19. added 2018-06-12
    Laypersons’ Beliefs and Intuitions About Free Will and Determinism: New Insights Linking the Social Psychology and Experimental Philosophy Paradigms.Gilad Feldman & Subramanya Prasad Mgmt Chandrashekar - 2018 - Social Psychological and Personality Science 1 (9):539-549.
    We linked between the social-psychology and experimental-philosophy paradigms for the study of folk intuitions and beliefs regarding the concept of free will to answer three questions: (1) what intuitions do people have about free-will and determinism? (2) do free will beliefs predict differences in free-will and determinism intuitions? and (3) is there more to free-will and determinism than experiencing certainty or uncertainty about the nature of the universe? Overall, laypersons viewed the universe as allowing for human indeterminism, and they did (...)
  20. added 2018-06-06
    Education and Free Will: Spinoza, Causal Determinism and Moral Formation.Johan Dahlbeck - 2018 - London, Storbritannien: Routledge.
    Education and Free Will critically assesses and makes use of Spinoza’s insights on human freedom to construe an account of education that is compatible with causal determinism without sacrificing the educational goal of increasing students’ autonomy and self-determination. Offering a thorough investigation into the philosophical position of causal determinism, Dahlbeck discusses Spinoza’s view of self-determination and presents his own suggestions for an education for autonomy from a causal determinist point of view. -/- The book begins by outlining the free will (...)
  21. added 2018-06-03
    Absolute Determinism and Lack of Free Will.Ulrich De Balbian - 2018 - Oxford: Create Space.
    Determinism from the 1st and 3rd person perspective as well as the universal point of reference aee dealt with. This is to show the absence of free will in the last perspective and the illusion of it when seen from the first two perspectives. ‘Free’ choice is dealt with as well as the absence of free will and the consequences of determinism for law and court judgements are explored. So, what if any, is the place and the role of God (...)
  22. added 2018-06-01
    Russell and the Temporal Contiguity of Causes and Effects.Graham Clay - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (6):1245-1264.
    There are some necessary conditions on causal relations that seem to be so trivial that they do not merit further inquiry. Many philosophers assume that the requirement that there could be no temporal gaps between causes and their effects is such a condition. Bertrand Russell disagrees. In this paper, an in-depth discussion of Russell’s argument against this necessary condition is the centerpiece of an analysis of what is at stake when one accepts or denies that there can be temporal gaps (...)
  23. added 2018-04-30
    The Replication Argument for Incompatibilism.Patrick Todd - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-19.
    In this paper, I articulate an argument for incompatibilism about moral responsibility and determinism. My argument comes in the form of an extend story, modeled loosely on Peter van Inwagen's "rollback argument" scenario. I thus call it "the replication argument." As I aim to bring out, though the argument is inspired by so-called "manipulation" and "original design" arguments, the argument is not a version of either such argument -- and plausibly has advantages over both. The result, I believe, is a (...)
  24. added 2018-04-17
    Mythen über die libertarische Freiheitsauffassung.Geert Keil - 2007 - In Jan-Christoph Heilinger (ed.), Naturgeschichte der Freiheit. de Gruyter. pp. 281-305.
    Der Kern der libertarischen Freiheitsauffassung ist das So-oder-Anderskönnen unter gegebenen Bedingungen, also die Annahme von Zwei-Wege-Vermögen. Dieses definierende Merkmal wird in der jüngeren Freiheitsdebatte mit einer Reihe von Zusatzbehauptungen verknüpft, die dem Libertarier unterschoben werden, um die Unhaltbarkeit seiner Position zu erweisen. Ich unterscheide vier dieser Mythen: Dem Mythos des Dualismus zufolge leugnen Libertarier, dass Personen und ihre Entscheidungen Teil der natürlichen Welt sind. Dem Mythos der Unbedingtheit zufolge nehmen sie an, dass ein freier Wille ein durch nichts bedingter Wille (...)
  25. added 2018-03-13
    Neuroscience and the Possibility of Locally Determined Choices: Reply to Adina Roskies and Eddy Nahmias.Marcelo Fischborn - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (1-2):198-201.
    In a previous paper, I argued that neuroscience and psychology could in principle undermine libertarian free will by providing support for a subset of what I called “statements of local determination.” I also argued that Libet-style experiments have not so far supported statements of that sort. In a commentary to the paper, Adina Roskies and Eddy Nahmias accept the claim about Libet-style experiments, but reject the claim about the possibilities of neuroscience. Here, I explain why I still disagree with their (...)
  26. added 2018-03-13
    Libet-Style Experiments, Neuroscience, and Libertarian Free Will.Marcelo Fischborn - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):494-502.
    People have disagreed on the significance of Libet-style experiments for discussions about free will. In what specifically concerns free will in a libertarian sense, some argue that Libet-style experiments pose a threat to its existence by providing support to the claim that decisions are determined by unconscious brain events. Others disagree by claiming that determinism, in a sense that conflicts with libertarian free will, cannot be established by sciences other than fundamental physics. This paper rejects both positions. First, it is (...)
  27. added 2018-03-10
    Libet and Freedom in a Mind-Haunted World.David Gordon Limbaugh & Robert Kelly - 2018 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 9 (1):42-44.
    Saigle, Dubljevic, and Racine (2018) claim that Libet-style experiments are insufficient to challenge that agents have free will. They support this with evidence from experimen- tal psychology that the folk concept of freedom is consis- tent with monism, that our minds are identical to our brains. However, recent literature suggests that evidence from experimental psychology is less than determinate in this regard, and that folk intuitions are too unrefined as to provide guidance on metaphysical issues like monism. In light of (...)
  28. added 2018-02-21
    Time and Tense. Unifying the Old and the New.Stamatios Gerogiorgakis - 2016 - Munich: Philosophia.
    Contents: -/- Bas C. van Fraassen, Introduction -/- Miloš Arsenijević, Avoiding Logical Determinism and Retaining the Principle of Bivalence within Temporal Modal Logic: Time as a Line-in-Drawing -/- Allan Bäck, The Reality of the Statement and the Now in Aristotle -/- Hans Burkhardt, Aristotle on Memory and Remembering and McTaggart’s A-Time and B-Time Series -/- Stamatios Gerogiorgakis, Late Ancient Paradoxes concerning Tense Revisited -/- Sonja Schierbaum, Ockham on Tense and Truth -/- Hylarie Kochiras, Newton’s Absolute Time -/- Christina Schneider, Monads, (...)
  29. added 2018-02-18
    The Will to Believe: And Other Essays in Popular Philosophy.William James - 2014 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    For this 1897 publication, the American philosopher William James brought together ten essays, some of which were originally talks given to Ivy League societies. Accessible to a broader audience, these non-technical essays illustrate the author's pragmatic approach to belief and morality, arguing for faith and action in spite of uncertainty. James thought his audiences suffered 'paralysis of their native capacity for faith' while awaiting scientific grounds for belief. His response consisted in an attitude of 'radical empiricism', which deals practically rather (...)
  30. added 2018-02-18
    Free Will: Critical Concepts in Philosophy.John Martin Fischer (ed.) - 2005 - Routledge.
    Over the last three decades there has been a tremendous amount of philosophical work in the Anglo-American tradition on the cluster of topics pertaining to Free Will. Contemporary work has in some instances been in the form of lively debates between proponents of different viewpoints, and literature surrounding the area is therefore characterized by a genuine vitality. This collection selects the very best of this material and presents it in a single, accessible set of volumes.
  31. added 2018-02-17
    The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy.Robert Pasnau & Christina Van Dyke (eds.) - 2010 - Cambridge University Press.
    The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy comprises over fifty specially commissioned essays by experts on the philosophy of this period. Starting in the late eighth century, with the renewal of learning some centuries after the fall of the Roman Empire, a sequence of chapters takes the reader through developments in many and varied fields, including logic and language, natural philosophy, ethics, metaphysics, and theology. Close attention is paid to the context of medieval philosophy, with discussions of the rise of the (...)
  32. added 2018-02-17
    Sorabji and the Dilemma of Determinism.Paul Russell - 1984 - Analysis 44 (4):166.
    IN Necessity, Cause and Blame (London: Duckworth, 1980) Richard Sorabji attempts to develop a notion of moral responsibility which does not get caught on either horn of a well known dilemma. One horn is the argument that if an action was caused then it must have been necessary and therefore could not be one for which the agent is responsible. The other horn is the argument that if the action was not caused then it is inexplicable and random and therefore (...)
  33. added 2018-02-17
    Determinism and Ethics.John Anderson - 1928 - Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy 6 (4):241-255.
  34. added 2017-12-29
    On Flew’s Compatibilism and His Objections to Theistic Libertarianism.Hakan Gundogdu - 2015 - Kaygı Uludağ University Faculty of Arts and Sciences Journal of Philosophy 25:115-142.
    Flew strongly defends a compatibilist thesis in the free will debate before going on to totally object to theistic libertarianism. His objections basically rely on his compatibilism embracing the notion of agent causation, which is not very common in compatibilist theses. Since he is a strong proponent of ordinary language philosophy, he also holds that linguistic analyses can certainly solve the free will problem as well as many other problems of philosophy. In doing so, he first uses the paradigm cases (...)
  35. added 2017-11-09
    The Explanatory Power of Local Miracle Compatibilism.Garrett Pendergraft - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):249-266.
    Local miracle compatibilists claim that we are sometimes able to do otherwise than we actually do, even if causal determinism obtains. When we can do otherwise, it will often be true that if we were to do otherwise, then an actual law of nature would not have been a law of nature. Nevertheless, it is a compatibilist principle that we cannot do anything that would be or cause an event that violates the laws of nature. Carl Ginet challenges this nomological (...)
  36. added 2017-11-07
    Does the Consequence Argument Beg the Question?John Martin Fischer & Garrett Pendergraft - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):575-595.
    The Consequence Argument has elicited various responses, ranging from acceptance as obviously right to rejection as obviously problematic in one way or another. Here we wish to focus on one specific response, according to which the Consequence Argument begs the question. This is a serious accusation that has not yet been adequately rebutted, and we aim to remedy that in what follows. We begin by giving a formulation of the Consequence Argument. We also offer some tentative proposals about the nature (...)
  37. added 2017-11-02
    Why Determinism in Physics has No Implications for Free Will.Michael Esfeld - unknown
    This paper argues for the following three theses: There is a clear reason to prefer physical theories with deterministic dynamical equations: such theories are both maximally simple and maximally rich in information, since given an initial configuration of matter and the dynamical equations, the whole evolution of the configuration of matter is fixed. There is a clear way how to introduce probabilities in a deterministic physical theory, namely as answer to the question of what evolution of a specific system we (...)
  38. added 2017-10-17
    Rolling Back the Luck Problem for Libertarianism.Zac Cogley - 2015 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 3 (1):121-137.
    I here sketch a reply to Peter van Inwagen’s Rollback Argument, which suggests that libertarian accounts of free agency are beset by problems involving luck. Van Inwagen imagines an indeterministic agent whose universe is repeatedly ‘rolled back’ by God to the time of her choice. Since the agent’s choice is indeterministic, her choices are sometimes di erent in the imaginary rollback scenarios. I show that although this is true, this need not impair her control over what she does. I develop (...)
  39. added 2017-09-18
    Freedom of the Will.Randolph Clarke - 2002 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 369--404.
    This chapter in the Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind surveys issues concerning free will. Topics include the compatibility question, compatibilist accounts, and libertarian accounts of free will.
  40. added 2017-08-07
    A New Investigation In To The Problem Of Perfect Determinism In Modern Science.S. Pokharna - 1985 - Indian Philosophical Quarterly 12 (1):67.
  41. added 2017-07-29
    Free Will, Determinism, and Moral Responsibility: An Analysis of Event-Causal Incompatibilism.Footh Gunnar - unknown
    In this project, I will analyze, summarize, and critique the incompatibilist theory known as source incompatibilism, which argues that a moral agent is morally responsible for an action only if they are the proper source of that action. More specifically, I will analyze the source incompatibilist views of event-causal incompatibilism, which argues that an agent has free will only if there exists indeterminacy in her decision-making process, either before the formation of a decision itself of during the formation of a (...)
  42. added 2017-07-29
    Aquinas on Free Will and Intellectual Determinism.Tobias Hoffmann & Cyrille Michon - 2017 - Philosophers' Imprint 17.
    From the early reception of Thomas Aquinas up to the present, many have interpreted his theory of liberum arbitrium to imply intellectual determinism: we do not control our choices, because we do not control the practical judgments that cause our choices. In this paper we argue instead that he rejects determinism in general and intellectual determinism in particular, which would effectively destroy liberum arbitrium as he conceives of it. We clarify that for Aquinas moral responsibility presupposes liberum arbitrium and thus (...)
  43. added 2017-07-25
    Student.Krishna Mantirraju - manuscript
    Freedom is an impossibility; the dream of having the ability to choose anything one wants is hampered by reality. However, what aspect of reality ultimately hampers the birth of true freedom? What I propose is that reality itself makes freedom impossible. Furthermore, I also make the logical assumption, from the evidence I have found, that the only entity that can have freedom is a being that is formless, timeless, featureless, and is an infinite environment of nothing. While my studies today (...)
  44. added 2017-07-24
    Determinism, Laws of Nature and the Consequence Argument.Pedro Merlussi - 2016 - Manuscrito 39 (1):73-95.
    Scott Sehon argues that the conception of determinism employed in the Consequence Argument is implausible because it rules out the logical possibility of the laws of nature being violated. Sehon says, for instance, that determinism is incompatible with the logical possibility of an interventionist God. His objection to the Consequence Argument boils down to a way of reading the box in what is implied by van Inwagen's conception of determinism. Sehon reads the box as logical necessity, and this clearly precludes (...)
  45. added 2017-07-13
    Ruyer and Simondon on Technological Inventiveness and Form Outlasting its Medium.Philippe Gagnon - 2017 - Deleuze and Guatarri Studies 11 (4):538-554.
    A summary is provided of Ruyer's important contribution, also a reversal from some conclusions held in his secondary doctoral dissertation, about the limits inherent in technological progress, and an attempt is made to show the coherence of this position to Ruyer's metaphysics. Simondon's response is also presented, and subsequently analyzed especially as it culminates in a concept of concretizations. As Simondon indicated, and with a displacement in Ruyer's limitating framework on unconditional growth, we end up searching for what represents the (...)
  46. added 2017-06-21
    Deliberating in the Presence of Manipulation.Yishai Cohen - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):85-105.
    According to deliberation compatibilism, rational deliberation is compatible with the belief that one’s actions are causally determined by factors beyond one’s control. This paper offers a counterexample to recent accounts of rational deliberation that entail deliberation compatibilism. The counterexample involves a deliberator who believes that whichever action she performs will be the result of deterministic manipulation. It is further argued that there is no relevant difference between the purported counterexample and ordinary doxastic circumstances in which a determinist deliberates.
  47. added 2017-06-13
    On the Logical Origin of the Laws Governing the Fundamental Forces of Nature: A New Algebraic-Axiomatic (Matrix) Approach.R. Zahedi - 2017 - In National Institute for Mathematical Sciences (INSMI - CNRS) Publcs., Paris, FRANCE. pp. 1-89.
    In this article, as a new mathematical approach to origin of the laws of nature, using a new basic algebraic axiomatic (matrix) formalism based on the ring theory and Clifford algebras (presented in Sec.2), “it is shown that certain mathematical forms of fundamental laws of nature, including laws governing the fundamental forces of nature (represented by a set of two definite classes of general covariant massive field equations, with new matrix formalisms), are derived uniquely from only a very few axioms”; (...)
  48. added 2017-04-13
    Why the Buddha Did Not Discuss "The Problem of Free Will and Determinism".Christopher W. Gowans - 2017 - In Rick Repetti (ed.), Buddhist Perspectives on Free Will: Agentless Agency? New York: Routledge. pp. 11-21.
    I argue that the Buddha did not discuss the free will and determinism problem because he only considered issues relating to overcoming suffering and his teaching about this did not raise the problem. As represented in the Nikāyas, the heart of his teaching was an empirically based account of the causes of suffering and how to modify these to end suffering. It was primarily a practical teaching about how to achieve this goal, more a craft knowledge than a philosophical theory (...)
  49. added 2017-04-13
    Determinism and Free Will in Alexander of Aphrodisias and the Arabic Tradition.Luis Xavier López-Farjeat - 2007 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 81:161-177.
    The Arabic tradition knew Alexander’s treatises On Fate and On Providence. Alexander criticizes the Stoic determinism with some peripatetic arguments. In those treatises we can find, at least, two positions: the peripatetic and “libertarian” position represented by Alexander, and Stoic determinism. A very similar discussion can be found in Islamic tradition. As S. Van den Bergh has insisted, Islamic theological schools had some Stoic influences. One of the issues in which we can find some common views is, precisely, the problem (...)
  50. added 2017-04-10
    On Hartshorne’s Objections to Determinism and Compatibilism.Hakan Gundogdu - 2014 - Eikasia Revista de Philosophia 54:93-106.
    The problem of determinism and human freedom, which is one of the great debates in philosophy, has been discussed many times by philosophers who have very distinctive perspectives and thereby different results related to the problem. Charles Hartshorne as an American process philosopher has significantly contributed to the debate with his own thoughts and considerations. His thoughts can be divided into two major parts. First is the claim that there is a relative indeterminism within the universe. Second is that (hard) (...)
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