Beliefs and desires incorporated
Journal of Philosophy 91 (8):404-25 (1994)
Abstract |
Suppose we admit for the sake of argument that "folk" explanations of human behavior--explanations in terms of beliefs and desires--sometimes succeed. They sometimes enable us to understand and predict patterns of motion that otherwise would remain unintelligible and unanticipated. Is the only explanation for such success that folk psychology is a viable proto-scientific theory of human psychology? I shall describe an analysis which yields a negative answer to that question. It was suggested by an observation and an analogy, both of which may initially seem remote from the topic at hand.
|
Keywords | Belief Desire Epistemology Folk Social Philosophy Dennett, D Descartes |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
ISBN(s) | 0022-362X |
DOI | jphil199491815 |
Options |
Save to my reading list
![]() ![]() |


No references found.

If Materialism is True, the United States is Probably Conscious.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1697-1721.
How to Share a Mind: Reconsidering the Group Mind Thesis.Thomas Szanto - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):99-120.
The Function of Folk Psychology: Mind Reading or Mind Shaping?Tadeusz W. Zawidzki - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):193 – 210.
Empirical Arguments for Group Minds: A Critical Appraisal.Robert D. Rupert - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (9):630-639.
Collective Intentionality and the Social Sciences.Deborah Perron Tollefsen - 2002 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (1):25-50.
View all 12 citations / Add more citations

Two Contrasts: Folk Craft Vs Folk Science and Belief Vs Opinion.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - In John D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology. Cambridge University Press. pp. 135--148.
Critter Psychology: On the Possibility of Nonhuman Animal Folk Psychology.Kristin Andrews - 2007 - In Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. Kluwer/Springer Press. pp. 191--209.
Restrictive Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes.Bennett Holman - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (1):61-70.
Thoughts Without Laws: Cognitive Science with Content.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (January):47-80.
In Defense of Folk Psychology.Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 59 (1):31-54.
It's in Your Nature: A Pluralistic Folk Psychology.Kristin Andrews - 2008 - Synthese 165 (1):13 - 29.
Added to PP index
2009-01-28
Total downloads
98 ( #58,502 of 2,225,265 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #181,125 of 2,225,265 )
2009-01-28
Total downloads
98 ( #58,502 of 2,225,265 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #181,125 of 2,225,265 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Monthly downloads
