Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (2):457-473 (2016)

D. Justin Coates
University of Houston
In this paper I argue that it is inappropriate for us to blame others if it is not reasonable for us to believe that they are morally responsible for their actions. The argument for this claim relies on two controversial claims: first, that assertion is governed by the epistemic norm of reasonable belief, and second, that the epistemic norm of implicatures is relevantly similar to the norm of assertion. I defend these claims, and I conclude by briefly suggesting how this putative norm of blame can serve as the basis for general norms of interpersonal generosity.
Keywords Blame  Epistemic norms  Assertion
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DOI 10.1007/s10677-015-9639-8
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References found in this work BETA

Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame.Thomas Scanlon - 2008 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Paradox of Self-Blame.Patrick Todd & Brian Rabern - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2):111–125.
The Knowledge Norm of Blaming.Christoph Kelp - 2020 - Analysis 80 (2):256-261.

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