Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (2):457-473 (2016)
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| Abstract |
In this paper I argue that it is inappropriate for us to blame others if it is not reasonable for us to believe that they are morally responsible for their actions. The argument for this claim relies on two controversial claims: first, that assertion is governed by the epistemic norm of reasonable belief, and second, that the epistemic norm of implicatures is relevantly similar to the norm of assertion. I defend these claims, and I conclude by briefly suggesting how this putative norm of blame can serve as the basis for general norms of interpersonal generosity.
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| Keywords | Blame Epistemic norms Assertion |
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| DOI | 10.1007/s10677-015-9639-8 |
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References found in this work BETA
Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame.Thomas Scanlon - 2008 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
View all 37 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
The Paradox of Self-Blame.Patrick Todd & Brian Rabern - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2):111–125.
The Standing To Blame, or Why Moral Disapproval Is What It Is.Stefan Riedener - 2019 - Dialectica 73 (1-2):183-210.
Blame and Fault: Toward a New Conative Theory of Blame.László Bernáth - 2020 - Disputatio 12 (59):371-394.
View all 8 citations / Add more citations
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