Philosophical Studies 177 (4):905-930 (2020)

Devin Sanchez Curry
West Virginia University
This article reconsiders the relationship between interpretivism about belief and normative standards. Interpretivists have traditionally taken beliefs to be fixed in relation to norms of interpretation. However, recent work by philosophers and psychologists reveals that human belief attribution practices are governed by a rich diversity of normative standards. Interpretivists thus face a dilemma: either give up on the idea that belief is constitutively normative or countenance a context-sensitive disjunction of norms that constitute belief. Either way, interpretivists should embrace the intersubjective indeterminacy of belief.
Keywords Belief  Normativity  Intersubjective Indeterminacy  Relativism  Davidson  Dennett
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-018-1212-6
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The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.

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Street Smarts.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):161-180.

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