Differentiating Shame from Guilt

Consciousness and Cognition 17 (4):1063-1400. (2008)

Abstract

How does shame differ from guilt? Empirical psychology has recently offered distinct and seemingly incompatible answers to this question. This article brings together four prominent answers into a cohesive whole. These are that (a) shame differs from guilt in being a social emotion; (b) shame, in contrast to guilt, affects the whole self; (c) shame is linked with ideals, whereas guilt concerns prohibitions and (d) shame is oriented towards the self, guilt towards others. After presenting the relevant empirical evidence, we defend specific interpretations of each of these answers and argue that they are related to four different dimensions of the emotions. This not only allows us to overcome the conclusion that the above criteria are either unrelated or conflicting with one another, it also allows us to tell apart what is constitutive from what is typical of them. -/- .

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Fabrice Teroni
University of Geneva

References found in this work

Emotions and Formal Objects.Fabrice Teroni - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (3):395-415.
Self-Discrepancy: A Theory Relating Self and Affect.E. Tory Higgins - 1987 - Psychological Review 94 (3):319-340.
From Appropriate Emotions to Values.Kevin Mulligan - 1998 - The Monist 81 (1):161-188.
An Apology for Moral Shame.Cheshire Calhoun - 2004 - Journal of Political Philosophy 12 (2):127–146.
Meta-Emotions.Christoph Jäger & Anne Bartsch - 2006 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):179-204.

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Citations of this work

Shame, Guilt and Morality.Fabrice Teroni & Otto Bruun - 2011 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (2):223-245.
Affectivity and Narrativity in Depression: A Phenomenological Study.Anna Bortolan - 2017 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 20 (1):77-88.
Affectivity and Moral Experience: An Extended Phenomenological Account.Anna Bortolan - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (3):471-490.
Guilt by Association?Michael Deem & Grant Ramsey - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):570-585.

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