Bioethics 23 (4):193-201 (2009)

Authors
Bert Gordijn
Dublin City University
Rob De Vries
University of Amsterdam
Abstract
This paper analyses the concept of empirical ethics as well as three meta-ethical fallacies that empirical ethics is said to face: the is-ought problem, the naturalistic fallacy and violation of the fact-value distinction. Moreover, it answers the question of whether empirical ethics (necessarily) commits these three basic meta-ethical fallacies.
Keywords empirical ethics  fact‐value distinction  is‐ought problem  naturalistic fallacy
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2009.01710.x
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