Abstract

The paper considers F. Brentano’s judgement theory and its influence upon the develop-ment of analytical philosophy. It is asserted that this judgement theory in Brentano’s reistic ontology, using the notion of accidental extension, leads to the creation of the existence of things “by word”. Such an “art” becomes possible only when the “accidental extension” is treated as an aesthetic or ethic evaluation. Brentano owes the separation of a logical evalua-tion of “truth” to Descartes’ dualism. Judgement theory does not satisfy the criterion of in-tersubjectivity. Therefore Brentano as well as his admirers must read the judgements by de-scription. It is stated that the description defence mechanism against the expression of the presented subject in language lies in the fact that it does not allow for the unique junction in the composition of the description of existence and essence (accidental extension), allowing to express the existence of only a part of the presented subject.