Supervenient Freedom and the Free Will Deadlock

Disputatio (45):219-243 (2017)

Authors
Tuomas K. Pernu
King's College London
Nadine Elzein
Oxford University
Abstract
Supervenient libertarianism maintains that indeterminism may exist at a supervening agency level, consistent with determinism at a subvening physical level. It seems as if this approach has the potential to break the longstanding deadlock in the free will debate, since it concedes to the traditional incompatibilist that agents can only do otherwise if they can do so in their actual circumstances, holding the past and the laws constant, while nonetheless arguing that this ability is compatible with physical determinism. However, we argue that supervenient libertarianism faces some serious problems, and that it fails to break us free from this deadlock within the free will debate.
Keywords Free will and moral responsibility  compatibilism and incompatibilism  determinism  non-reductive physicalism  supervenient libertarianism
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DOI 10.1515/disp-2017-0005
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References found in this work BETA

Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.
Masked Abilities and Compatibilism.M. Fara - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):843-865.
An Essay on Free Will.Michael Slote - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (6):327-330.

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Citations of this work BETA

Can Physics Make Us Free?Tuomas K. Pernu - 2017 - Frontiers in Physics 5.
The Demand for Contrastive Explanations.Nadine Elzein - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1325-1339.

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