Noûs 37 (2):353–370 (2003)
This critical study of the third book of Plantinga's trilogy on proper-function epistemology begins by denying that classical foundationalism proposes a deontic conception of justification. Nor is it subject to Gettier counterexamples, as, I show, Plantinga's fallibilism is and must be. Plantinga's central thesis is that there's no way of attacking the rationality of central Christian beliefs without attacking their truth. That, I argue, is not so on several grounds, e.g., because one can demand independent evidence for the existence of the _sensus divinitatis
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Plantinga's Case Against Naturalistic Epistemology.Evan Fales - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (3):432-451.
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