Towards a computational theory of experience

Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):807-827 (2011)
Authors
Tomer Fekete
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
Abstract
A standing challenge for the science of mind is to account for the datum that every mind faces in the most immediate – that is, unmediated – fashion: its phenomenal experience. The complementary tasks of explaining what it means for a system to give rise to experience and what constitutes the content of experience (qualia) in computational terms are particularly challenging, given the multiple realizability of computation. In this paper, we identify a set of conditions that a computational theory must satisfy for it to constitute not just a sufficient but a necessary, and therefore naturalistic and intrinsic, explanation of qualia. We show that a common assumption behind many neurocomputational theories of the mind, according to which mind states can be formalized solely in terms of instantaneous vectors of activities of representational units such as neurons, does not meet the requisite conditions, in part because it relies on inactive units to shape presently experienced qualia and implies a homogeneous representation space, which is devoid of intrinsic structure. We then sketch a naturalistic computational theory of qualia, which posits that experience is realized by dynamical activity-space trajectories (rather than points) and that its richness is measured by the representational capacity of the trajectory space in which it unfolds.
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DOI 10.1016/j.concog.2011.02.010
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References found in this work BETA

Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Toward a Neurobiological Theory of Consciousness.Francis Crick & Christof Koch - 1990 - Seminars in the Neurosciences 2:263-275.
Dreaming and the Brain: Toward a Cognitive Neuroscience of Conscious States.J. Allan Hobson, Edward F. Pace-Schott & Robert Stickgold - 2003 - In Edward F. Pace-Schott, Mark Solms, Mark Blagrove & Stevan Harnad (eds.), Sleep and Dreaming: Scientific Advances and Reconsiderations. Cambridge University Press. pp. 793-842.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Computational Stance is Unfit for Consciousness.Riccardo Manzotti - 2012 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 4 (2):401-420.
Naturalizing What? Varieties of Naturalism and Transcendental Phenomenology.Maxwell J. D. Ramstead - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):929-971.

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