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Tomer Fekete
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
  1.  55
    Towards a Computational Theory of Experience.Tomer Fekete & Shimon Edelman - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):807-827.
    A standing challenge for the science of mind is to account for the datum that every mind faces in the most immediate – that is, unmediated – fashion: its phenomenal experience. The complementary tasks of explaining what it means for a system to give rise to experience and what constitutes the content of experience (qualia) in computational terms are particularly challenging, given the multiple realizability of computation. In this paper, we identify a set of conditions that a computational theory must (...)
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  2.  54
    System, Subsystem, Hive: Boundary Problems in Computational Theories of Consciousness.Tomer Fekete, Cees van Leeuwen & Shimon Edelman - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
    A computational theory of consciousness should include a quantitative measure of consciousness, or MoC, that (i) would reveal to what extent a given system is conscious, (ii) would make it possible to compare not only different systems, but also the same system at different times, and (iii) would be graded, because so is consciousness. However, unless its design is properly constrained, such an MoC gives rise to what we call the boundary problem: an MoC that labels a system as conscious (...)
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  3.  53
    Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience.Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete & Neta Zach (eds.) - 2012 - John Benjamins.
    The chapters comprising this book represent a collective attempt on the part of their authors to redress this aberration.
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  4.  78
    Representational Systems.Tomer Fekete - 2010 - Minds and Machines 20 (1):69-101.
    The concept of representation has been a key element in the scientific study of mental processes, ever since such studies commenced. However, usage of the term has been all but too liberal—if one were to adhere to common use it remains unclear if there are examples of physical systems which cannot be construed in terms of representation. The problem is considered afresh, taking as the starting point the notion of activity spaces—spaces of spatiotemporal events produced by dynamical systems. It is (...)
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  5.  28
    Being in Time.Shimon Edelman & Tomer Fekete - 2012 - In Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete & Neta Zach (eds.), Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience. John Benjamins. pp. 88--81.
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  6.  1
    In the Interest of Saving Time: A Critique of Discrete Perception.Tomer Fekete, Sander Van de Cruys, Vebjørn Ekroll & Cees van Leeuwen - 2018 - Neuroscience of Consciousness 2018 (1):1-8.
    A recently proposed model of sensory processing suggests that perceptual experience is updated in discrete steps. We show that the data advanced to support discrete perception are in fact compatible with a continuous account of perception. Physiological and psychophysical constraints, moreover, as well as our awake-primate imaging data, imply that human neuronal networks cannot support discrete updates of perceptual content at the maximal update rates consistent with phenomenology. A more comprehensive approach to understanding the physiology of perception (and experience at (...)
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  7.  24
    The (Lack of) Mental Life of Some Machines.Tomer Fekete & Shimon Edelman - 2012 - In Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete & Neta Zach (eds.), Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience. John Benjamins.. pp. 88--95.
    The proponents of machine consciousness predicate the mental life of a machine, if any, exclusively on its formal, organizational structure, rather than on its physical composition. Given that matter is organized on a range of levels in time and space, this generic stance must be further constrained by a principled choice of levels on which the posited structure is supposed to reside. Indeed, not only must the formal structure fit well the physical system that realizes it, but it must do (...)
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