15 found
Paul Schweizer [15]Paul Edward Schweizer [1]
  1.  94
    Paul Schweizer (1998). The Truly Total Turing Test. Minds and Machines 8 (2):263-272.
    The paper examines the nature of the behavioral evidence underlying attributions of intelligence in the case of human beings, and how this might be extended to other kinds of cognitive system, in the spirit of the original Turing Test. I consider Harnad's Total Turing Test, which involves successful performance of both linguistic and robotic behavior, and which is often thought to incorporate the very same range of empirical data that is available in the human case. However, I argue that the (...)
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  2.  76
    Paul Schweizer (1994). Intentionality, Qualia, and Mind/Brain Identity. Minds and Machines 4 (3):259-82.
    The paper examines the status of conscious presentation with regard to mental content and intentional states. I argue that conscious presentation of mental content should be viewed on the model of a secondary quality, as a subjectiveeffect of the microstructure of an underlying brain state. The brain state is in turn viewed as the instantiation of an abstract computational state, with the result that introspectively accessible content is interpreted as a presentation of the associated computational state realized by the brain. (...)
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  3.  71
    Paul Schweizer (2009). The Elimination of Meaning in Computational Theories of Mind. In A. Hieke & H. Leitgeb (eds.), Reduction: Between the Mind and the Brain. Ontos Verlag. pp. 12--117.
  4.  11
    Paul Schweizer (1992). A Syntactical Approach to Modality. Journal of Philosophical Logic 21 (1):1 - 31.
    The systems T N and T M show that necessity can be consistently construed as a predicate of syntactical objects, if the expressive/deductive power of the system is deliberately engineered to reflect the power of the original object language operator. The system T N relies on salient limitations on the expressive power of the language L N through the construction of a quotational hierarchy, while the system T Mrelies on limiting the scope of the modal axioms schemas to the sublanguage (...)
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  5. Paul Schweizer (1993). Mind/Consciousness Dualism in Sankhya-Yoga Philosophy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):845-859.
  6.  22
    Paul Schweizer (1987). Necessity Viewed as a Semantical Predicate. Philosophical Studies 52 (1):33 - 47.
  7.  50
    Paul Schweizer (2012). The Externalist Foundations of a Truly Total Turing Test. Minds and Machines 22 (3):191-212.
    The paper begins by examining the original Turing Test (2T) and Searle’s antithetical Chinese Room Argument, which is intended to refute the 2T in particular, as well as any formal or abstract procedural theory of the mind in general. In the ensuing dispute between Searle and his own critics, I argue that Searle’s ‘internalist’ strategy is unable to deflect Dennett’s combined robotic-systems reply and the allied Total Turing Test (3T). Many would hold that the 3T marks the culmination of the (...)
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  8.  6
    Paul Schweizer (1993). Quantified Quinean S. Journal of Philosophical Logic 22 (6):589 - 605.
  9.  17
    Paul Schweizer (2000). James Trefil, Are We Unique? A Scientist Explores the Unparalleled Intelligence of the Human Mind, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1997, XII + 243 Pp., $24.95 (Cloth), ISBN 0-471-15536-. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 10 (2):309-313.
  10.  15
    Paul Schweizer (1991). Blind Grasping and Fregean Senses. Philosophical Studies 62 (3):263 - 287.
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  11.  41
    Paul Schweizer (1996). Physicalism, Functionalism, and Conscious Thought. Minds and Machines 6 (1):61-87.
    In this paper, I provide further elaboration of my theory of conscious experience, in response to the criticisms made by David Cole, and I directly address a number of the issues he raises. In particular, I examine Cole's claim that functionalism rather than neurophysiology is the theoretical key to consciousness. I argue that weak type-physicalism provides an analysis which is more fine grained, makes weaker assumptions, and allows more scope for empirical methods.
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  12.  34
    Paul Schweizer (2002). Consciousness and Computation. Minds and Machines 12 (1):143-144.
  13.  24
    Paul Schweizer (1994). Momentary Consciousness and Buddhist Epistemology. Journal of Indian Philosophy 22 (1):81-91.
  14.  15
    Paul Schweizer (1993). Indian Philosophy of Language. International Philosophical Quarterly 33 (3):373-376.
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  15.  4
    R. S. Bluck, Benson Mates, William Prior, Gail Fine, Richard Parry, Richard Sharvy & Paul Schweizer (1997). How (Not) to Exempt Platonic Forms From Parmenides' Third Man. Phronesis 42 (1):1.
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