19 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Paul Schweizer [20]Paul Edward Schweizer [1]
  1. Computation in Physical Systems: A Normative Mapping Account.Paul Schweizer - 2019 - In Matteo Vincenzo D'Alfonso & Don Berkich (eds.), On the Cognitive, Ethical, and Scientific Dimensions of Artificial Intelligence. Springer Verlag. pp. 27-47.
    The relationship between abstract formal procedures and the activities of actual physical systems has proved to be surprisingly subtle and controversial, and there are a number of competing accounts of when a physical system can be properly said to implement a mathematical formalism and hence perform a computation. I defend an account wherein computational descriptions of physical systems are high-level normative interpretations motivated by our pragmatic concerns. Furthermore, the criteria of utility and success vary according to our diverse purposes and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  2. Triviality Arguments Reconsidered.Paul Schweizer - 2019 - Minds and Machines 29 (2):287-308.
    Opponents of the computational theory of mind have held that the theory is devoid of explanatory content, since whatever computational procedures are said to account for our cognitive attributes will also be realized by a host of other ‘deviant’ physical systems, such as buckets of water and possibly even stones. Such ‘triviality’ claims rely on a simple mapping account of physical implementation. Hence defenders of CTM traditionally attempt to block the trivialization critique by advocating additional constraints on the implementation relation. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  3. Cognitive Computation sans Representation.Paul Schweizer - 2017 - In Thomas M. Powers (ed.), Philosophy and Computing: Essays in epistemology, philosophy of mind, logic, and ethics. Cham: Springer. pp. 65-84.
    The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) holds that cognitive processes are essentially computational, and hence computation provides the scientific key to explaining mentality. The Representational Theory of Mind (RTM) holds that representational content is the key feature in distinguishing mental from non-mental systems. I argue that there is a deep incompatibility between these two theoretical frameworks, and that the acceptance of CTM provides strong grounds for rejecting RTM. The focal point of the incompatibility is the fact that representational content is (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  4. Sāṃkhya-Yoga Philosophy and the Mind-Body Problem.Paul Schweizer - 2019 - Prabuddha Bharata or Awakened India 124 (1):232-242.
    The relationship between the physical body and the conscious human mind has been a deeply problematic topic for centuries. Physicalism is the 'orthodox' metaphysical stance in contemporary Western thought, according to which reality is exclusively physical/material in nature. However, in the West, theoretical dissatisfaction with this type of approach has historically lead to Cartesian-style dualism, wherein mind and body are thought to belong to distinct metaphysical realms. In the current discussion I compare and contrast this standard Western approach with an (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  5. The truly total Turing test.Paul Schweizer - 1998 - Minds and Machines 8 (2):263-272.
    The paper examines the nature of the behavioral evidence underlying attributions of intelligence in the case of human beings, and how this might be extended to other kinds of cognitive system, in the spirit of the original Turing Test. I consider Harnad's Total Turing Test, which involves successful performance of both linguistic and robotic behavior, and which is often thought to incorporate the very same range of empirical data that is available in the human case. However, I argue that the (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  6. The Externalist Foundations of a Truly Total Turing Test.Paul Schweizer - 2012 - Minds and Machines 22 (3):191-212.
    The paper begins by examining the original Turing Test (2T) and Searle’s antithetical Chinese Room Argument, which is intended to refute the 2T in particular, as well as any formal or abstract procedural theory of the mind in general. In the ensuing dispute between Searle and his own critics, I argue that Searle’s ‘internalist’ strategy is unable to deflect Dennett’s combined robotic-systems reply and the allied Total Turing Test (3T). Many would hold that the 3T marks the culmination of the (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  7.  38
    A syntactical approach to modality.Paul Schweizer - 1992 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 21 (1):1 - 31.
    The systems T N and T M show that necessity can be consistently construed as a predicate of syntactical objects, if the expressive/deductive power of the system is deliberately engineered to reflect the power of the original object language operator. The system T N relies on salient limitations on the expressive power of the language L N through the construction of a quotational hierarchy, while the system T Mrelies on limiting the scope of the modal axioms schemas to the sublanguage (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  8. Mind/consciousness dualism in sankhya-yoga philosophy.Paul Schweizer - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):845-859.
  9. Intentionality, qualia, and mind/brain identity.Paul Schweizer - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (3):259-82.
    The paper examines the status of conscious presentation with regard to mental content and intentional states. I argue that conscious presentation of mental content should be viewed on the model of a secondary quality, as a subjectiveeffect of the microstructure of an underlying brain state. The brain state is in turn viewed as the instantiation of an abstract computational state, with the result that introspectively accessible content is interpreted as a presentation of the associated computational state realized by the brain. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  10. Advaita and the philosophy of consciousness without an object.Paul Schweizer - 2020 - Prabuddha Bharata or Awakened India 125 (No. 1):146-154.
    The paper explores Śaṅkara's position on autonomous consciousness, or cit, as the fundamental reality. As such, cit transcends subject/object duality, and Śaṅkara holds that consciousness is ultimately nirviṣayaka or non-intentional. I compare and contrast the Advaita view with the contemporary Phenomenological account, wherein consciousness is held to be essentially intentional, so that consciousness is always of or about some object or content, and where consciousness without an object is deemed conceptually impossible.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11.  82
    Consciousness and computation.Paul Schweizer - 2002 - Minds and Machines 12 (1):143-144.
  12.  47
    Necessity viewed as a semantical predicate.Paul Schweizer - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 52 (1):33 - 47.
  13. Artificial Brains and Hybrid Minds.Paul Schweizer - 2017 - In Vincent C. Müller (ed.), Philosophy and theory of artificial intelligence 2017. Berlin: Springer. pp. 81-91.
    The paper develops two related thought experiments exploring variations on an ‘animat’ theme. Animats are hybrid devices with both artificial and biological components. Traditionally, ‘components’ have been construed in concrete terms, as physical parts or constituent material structures. Many fascinating issues arise within this context of hybrid physical organization. However, within the context of functional/computational theories of mentality, demarcations based purely on material structure are unduly narrow. It is abstract functional structure which does the key work in characterizing the respective (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14.  46
    Blind grasping and Fregean senses.Paul Schweizer - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 62 (3):263 - 287.
    The foregoing considerations have shown that on the Fregean model, no descriptive rendition of the meaning of a word, and no feature of the subject's psychological state, will be sufficient to answer the question of how reference takes place. Reference is determined by an independent semantical object, and the mind is limited by its perceptual access to this external semantical realm. The psychological and epistemic states of the language user will be causally influenced by this perceptual contact, and such causal (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  15.  27
    (1 other version)Indian Philosophy of Language.Paul Schweizer - 1993 - International Philosophical Quarterly 33 (3):373-376.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16.  55
    Momentary consciousness and buddhist epistemology.Paul Schweizer - 1994 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 22 (1):81-91.
  17.  70
    Physicalism, functionalism and conscious thought.Paul Schweizer - 1996 - Minds and Machines 6 (1):61-87.
    In this paper, I provide further elaboration of my theory of conscious experience, in response to the criticisms made by David Cole, and I directly address a number of the issues he raises. In particular, I examine Cole's claim that functionalism rather than neurophysiology is the theoretical key to consciousness. I argue that weak type-physicalism provides an analysis which is more fine grained, makes weaker assumptions, and allows more scope for empirical methods.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  18.  36
    Quantified Quinean S.Paul Schweizer - 1993 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 22 (6):589 - 605.
  19.  92
    The Elimination of Meaning in Computational Theories of Mind.Paul Schweizer - 2009 - In Alexander Hieke & Hannes Leitgeb (eds.), Reduction: Between the Mind and the Brain. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. pp. 117-134.