The Virtues of Ignorance

Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (3):335-350 (2012)
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Abstract

It is commonly claimed that fully virtuous individuals cannot be ignorant and that everyday intuitions support this fact. Others maintain that there are virtues of ignorance and most people recognize them. Both views cannot be correct. We report evidence from three experiments suggesting that ignorance does not rule out folk attributions of virtue. Additionally, results show that many of these judgments can be predicted by one’s emotional stability—a heritable personality trait. We argue that these results are philosophically important for the study of virtue and we discuss some of the ways individual differences may inform and facilitate current debates in ethics. We close with a cautionary argument detailing the risks of discounting some intuitions simply because they are associated with seemingly less desirable personality traits.

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Adam Feltz
Michigan Technological University

Citations of this work

Modesty's Inoffensive Self-Presentation.Derick Hughes - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37:1-23.
Consequentialism and Virtue.Robert J. Hartman & Joshua W. Bronson - 2021 - In Christoph Halbig & Felix Timmermann (eds.), Handbuch Tugend Und Tugendethik. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. pp. 307-320.

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References found in this work

Nicomachean ethics. Aristotle - 1999 - New York: Clarendon Press. Edited by Michael Pakaluk. Translated by Michael Pakaluk.
On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
On Virtue Ethics.Rosalind Hursthouse - 1999 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Doing without concepts.Edouard Machery - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior.John M. Doris - 2002 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

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