Stalnaker on Intentionality: On Robert Stalnaker’s Inquiry

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 67 (April):98-112 (1986)

Authors
Hartry Field
New York University
Abstract
Argues that there are two reasons for ascribing to mental states, structures more fine-grained than the sets of possible world they represent: first, fine-grained structure enters naturally into the explanation of behaviour; second, fine-grained structure is needed in a theory of how those states represent the sets of possible worlds they represent. In connection with the first point, it is argued that Stalnaker’s attempt to use metalinguistic content to obviate the need of fine-grained structure cannot work. In connection with the second point, it is argued that the systematicity in the assignment of content to mental states can be accommodated only by postulating a fine-grained structure for mental states. Also contains some discussion of doing without representational content, understood in the non-deflationary sense that Stalnaker assumes.
Keywords Epistemology  Intensionality  Linguistic Truth  Pragmatic  Stalnaker, R
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2001
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 63,360
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Misinformation.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 1989 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):533-50.
Provincialism in Pragmatics.Josh Armstrong - 2018 - Philosophical Perspectives 32 (1):5-40.
Misinformation.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 1989 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):533-550.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
98 ( #109,809 of 2,448,853 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #444,630 of 2,448,853 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes