The small improvement argument, epistemicism and incomparability

Economics and Philosophy 34 (2):199-219 (2018)
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:The Small Improvement Argument is the leading argument for value incomparability. All vagueness-based accounts of the SIA have hitherto assumed the truth of supervaluationism, but supervaluationism has some well-known problems. This paper explores the implications of epistemicism, a leading rival theory. We argue that if epistemicism is true, then options are comparable in small improvement cases. Moreover, even if SIAs do not exploit vagueness, if epistemicism is true, then options cannot be on a par. The epistemicist account of the SIA has an advantage over leading existing rival accounts of the SIA because it accounts for higher-order hard cases.



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Author Profiles

Edmund Tweedy Flanigan
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
John Halstead
Oxford University

Citations of this work

Epistemicism and Commensurability.Paul Forrester - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - New York: Routledge.
The Morality of Freedom.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Philosophy 63 (243):119-122.
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):589-601.
The possibility of parity.Ruth Chang - 2002 - Ethics 112 (4):659-688.

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