The small improvement argument

Synthese 165 (1):127 - 139 (2008)

Authors
Nicolas Espinoza
Stockholm University
Abstract
It is commonly assumed that moral deliberation requires that the alternatives available in a choice situation are evaluatively comparable. This comparability assumption is threatened by claims of incomparability, which is often established by means of the small improvement argument (SIA). In this paper I argue that SIA does not establish incomparability in a stricter sense. The reason is that it fails to distinguish incomparability from a kind of evaluative indeterminacy which may arise due to the vagueness of the evaluative comparatives ‘better than,’ ‘worse than,’ and ‘equally as good as.’.
Keywords Value relations  Incomparability  Small improvement argument  Vagueness
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-007-9243-0
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
The Morality of Freedom.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - Routledge.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
Vagueness, Truth and Logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.

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