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objection), or it is causally determined (undermining Goetz's allegiance to non-causal agency). I suspect that confusion over equivocal uses of 'choice'may explain why someone would say that a reason for an action (say Ra2) is the reason for a choice, even when it is neither intrinsically more compelling than other reasons for action
Religious Studies 46 (1) (2010)
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