On the genuine queerness of moral properties and facts

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (2):137 – 146 (1990)
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10.1080/00048409012344161

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Richard Garner
Last affiliation: Ohio State University

Citations of this work

Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence.Jonas Olson - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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