A Bayesian proof of a Humean principle

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (2):255-256 (1991)
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Abstract

Hume bases his argument against miracles on an informal principle. This paper gives a formal explication of this principle of Hume’s, and then shows that this explication can be rigorously proved in a Bayesian framework

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Donald Gillies
University College London

Citations of this work

Twenty Questions about Hume's “Of Miracles”.Peter Millican - 2011 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 68:151-192.
David Hume's no-miracles argument begets a valid No-Miracles Argument.Colin Howson - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 54:41-45.
The Hume Literature, 1986-1993.William E. Morris - 1994 - Hume Studies 20 (2):299-326.

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