Malicious pleasure evaluated: Is pleasure an unconditional good?

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1):24–31 (2003)
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Abstract

Pleasure is one of the strongest candidates for an occurrence that might be good, in some respect, unconditionally. Malicious pleasure is one of the most often cited alleged counter-examples to pleasure’s being an unconditional good. Correctly evaluating malicious pleasure is more complex than people realize. I defend pleasure’s unconditionally good status from critics of malicious pleasure.

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Irwin Goldstein
Davidson College

Citations of this work

Intrinsic vs. extrinsic value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
An Honest Look at Hybrid Theories of Pleasure.Daniel Pallies - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):887-907.
Six theses about pleasure.Stuart Rachels - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):247-267.

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