Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1):24–31 (2003)
AbstractPleasure is one of the strongest candidates for an occurrence that might be good, in some respect, unconditionally. Malicious pleasure is one of the most often cited alleged counter-examples to pleasure’s being an unconditional good. Correctly evaluating malicious pleasure is more complex than people realize. I defend pleasure’s unconditionally good status from critics of malicious pleasure.
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Citations of this work
An Honest Look at Hybrid Theories of Pleasure.Daniel Pallies - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):887-907.
Welfarism.Ben Bramble - forthcoming - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2nd print edition.
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