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  1. added 2020-05-08
    On Some Arguments for Epistemic Value Pluralism.Timothy Perrine - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (1):77-96.
    Epistemic Value Monism is the view that there is only one kind of thing of basic, final epistemic value. Perhaps the most plausible version of Epistemic Value Monism is Truth Value Monism, the view that only true beliefs are of basic, final epistemic value. Several authors—notably Jonathan Kvanvig and Michael DePaul—have criticized Truth Value Monism by appealing to the epistemic value of things other than knowledge. Such arguments, if successful, would establish Epistemic Value Pluralism is true and Epistemic Value Monism (...)
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  2. added 2020-05-07
    Values of the Human Person. Contemporary Challenges.Pop Mihaela (ed.) - 2014 - Bucharest: Editura Universității din București.
    Contemporary knowledge is centered on the research on human dimensions. Philosophy should particularly appeal to values in the process of understanding the human nature. The valuable “becoming” of each human person requires growing ever more aware of his/her personal identity and of his/her role in this lifetime. In ethics, especially, values suppose moral choices or criteria on which a moral behavior is based. Max Scheler based his ethical theory on the distinction between goods and values. The “goods” are things to (...)
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  3. added 2020-05-04
    The Explanatory Objection to the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value.Francesco Orsi & Andrés G. Garcia - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-15.
    The fitting attitude analysis of value states that for objects to have value is for them to be the fitting targets of attitudes. Good objects are the fitting targets of positive attitudes, while bad objects are the fitting targets of negative attitudes. The following paper presents an argument to the effect that value and the fittingness of attitudes differ in terms of their explanations. Whereas the fittingness of attitudes is explained, inter alia, by both the properties of attitudes and those (...)
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  4. added 2020-05-01
    Repugnance and Perfection.Nikhil Venkatesh - forthcoming - Philosophy and Public Affairs.
    A foundational problem in population ethics is his “repugnant conclusion", introduced by Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons. It holds that for any possible population of at least ten billion lives of very high positive welfare, there is some larger possible population of lives of very low positive welfare whose existence would be better, if other things are equal. I call this claim RC1. In this article, I argue that by carefully considering the nature and variety of possible lives of (...)
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  5. added 2020-04-11
    Problem Aksiologis Penggunaan Subjek Manusia Dalam Kasus Hipotermia Nazi.Banin Diar Sukmono - 2017 - Cogito: Jurnal Mahasiswa Filsafat 4 (1):45-57.
    Artikel ini bertujuan untuk memperlihatkan pentingnya prinsip penghargaan atas subjek dalam penelitian ilmiah. Dengan menjadikan kasus hipotermia Nazi sebagai contoh, artikel ini akan menunjukkan masalah yang terjadi saat prinsip penghargaan atas subjek absen dalam andaian aksiologis penelitian. Metode yang digunakan dalam artikel ini adalah evaluasi kritis dalam tataran prinsip dan kerangka riset. Hasil evaluasi menunjukkan bahwa ketidakhadiran prinsip penghargaan atas subjek adalah konsekuensi logis atas lemahnya kerangka riset yang dijalankan Nazi dalam penelitian hipotermianya. Dengan kata lain, problem non-epistemik yang tidak (...)
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  6. added 2020-03-25
    Quantifying Health Across Populations.Stephen Kershnar - 2016 - Bioethics 30 (6):451-461.
    In this article, I argue that as a theoretical matter, a population's health-level is best quantified via averagism. Averagism asserts that the health of a population is the average of members’ health-levels. This model is better because it does not fall prey to a number of objections, including the repugnant conclusion, and because it is not arbitrary. I also argue that as a practical matter, population health-levels are best quantified via totalism. Totalism asserts that the health of a population is (...)
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  7. added 2020-03-25
    Solving the Most Valuable Player Problem.Stephen Kershnar - 2008 - Journal of Social Philosophy 39 (1):141–159.
    In this essay, I argue for the claim that the MVP is the player who provides the greatest net benefit to his team. I then argued for the following model of a player’s net benefit to her team. (1) A person’s, X’s, net benefit to the team is a function of the difference in team success when X plays and when her actual or likely backup plays. I argued that this model best satisfies our intuitions, measures actual value rather than (...)
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  8. added 2020-03-25
    Hurka's Theory of Virtue.Stephen Kershnar - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (2):159-168.
    Thomas Hurka has put forth a powerful account of virtue. The account rests on a specification of intrinsically good mental states and then explains what unifies them. On his account, virtue and desert also share the same structure. His theory of virtue has some difficulties that threaten the structure that unifies it. First, Hurka's account cannot provide a principled account of virtue and vice when they are constituted by attitudes toward things are not intrinsically good (e.g., nonexistent state of affairs). (...)
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  9. added 2020-03-24
    The Most-Valuable-Player Problem Remains Unsolved.Stephen Kershnar - 2011 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 38 (2):167-174.
    Stephen Kershnar’s model of the most valuable player fails. It does not track total value and this is what a team values, although perhaps the best model should focus on player-related value. In any case, the model does not succeed as a model of player-value because player-value is indeterminate. The indeterminacy results from boundary problems with the player-role and, perhaps also, indeterminacy in the baseline state. In addition, Kershnar’s framework is misguided because winning is not intrinsically valuable and is not (...)
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  10. added 2020-03-15
    Divine Satisficing and the Ethics of the Problem of Evil.Chris Tucker - forthcoming - Faith and Philosophy.
    This paper accomplishes three goals. First, it reveals that God’s ethics has a radical satisficing structure: God can choose a good enough suboptimal option even if there is a best option and no countervailing considerations. Second, it resolves the long-standing worry that there is no account of the good enough that is both principled and demanding enough to be good enough. Third, it vindicates the key ethical assumption in the problem of evil without relying on the contested assumption that God’s (...)
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  11. added 2020-02-25
    Totalism Without Repugnance.Jacob M. Nebel - forthcoming - In Festschrift for Derek Parfit.
    Totalism is the view that one distribution of well-being is better than another just in case the one contains a greater sum of well-being than the other. Many philosophers, following Parfit, reject totalism on the grounds that it entails the repugnant conclusion that, for any number of excellent lives, there is some number of mediocre lives whose existence would be better. This paper develops a theory of welfare aggregation—the lexical-threshold view—that allows totalism to avoid the repugnant conclusion, as well as (...)
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  12. added 2020-02-25
    Rank-Weighted Utilitarianism and the Veil of Ignorance.Jacob M. Nebel - forthcoming - Ethics.
    Lara Buchak argues for a version of rank-weighted utilitarianism that assigns greater weight to the interests of the worse off. She argues that our distributive principles should be derived from the preferences of rational individuals behind a veil of ignorance, who ought to be risk averse. I argue that Buchak’s appeal to the veil of ignorance leads to a particular way of extending rank-weighted utilitarianism to the evaluation of uncertain prospects. This method recommends choices that violate the unanimous preferences of (...)
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  13. added 2020-02-24
    Asymmetries in the Value of Existence.Jacob M. Nebel - forthcoming - Philosophical Perspectives.
    According to asymmetric comparativism, it is worse for a person to exist with a miserable life than not to exist, but it is not better for a person to exist with a happy life than not to exist. My aim in this paper is to explain how asymmetric comparativism could possibly be true. My account of asymmetric comparativism begins with a different asymmetry, regarding the (dis)value of early death. I offer an account of this early death asymmetry, appealing to the (...)
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  14. added 2020-02-16
    Relaciones familiares y su incidencia en el desarrollo de valores morales en niños ecuatorianos.Xiomara Carrera-Herrera, Miury Placencia Tapia & Paulo Vélez-León - 2019 - Analysis. Claves de Pensamiento Contemporáneo 24:65-75.
    Las relaciones familiares tienen una cualidad única que no se producen en otros entornos y cada familia vive diferentes prácticas que la hacen ser irrepetible; esto permite un aprender–aprender como padres e hijos, además estás relaciones tienen correspondencia con el desarrollo de los valores que se manifiesta en familia y que finalmente son transmitidos en la sociedad. La investigación se realizó a nivel nacional a 1200 niños y niñas en edades comprendidas entre 8 a 11 años, pudiendo observar con más (...)
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  15. added 2020-02-11
    Book Review:The Forms of Value: The Extension of a Hedonistic Axiology. A. L. Hilliard.Robert G. Stephens - 1950 - Ethics 61 (4):323-325.
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  16. added 2020-01-14
    The Welfare-Nihilist Arguments Against Judgment Subjectivism.Anthony Kelley - forthcoming - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    One way to construe subjectivism about well-being is as the view that x is basically good for S if and only if, because, and to the extent that x is valued, under the proper conditions, by S. Dale Dorsey argues for an idealized, judgment-based theory of valuing, one according to which a person values a thing if and only if, because, and to the extent that she would believe, under the proper conditions, that it is basically good for herself. Call (...)
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  17. added 2019-11-28
    Testing for Intrinsic Value, for Us as We Are.Daniel Coren - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-26.
    Philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Brentano, Moore, and Chisholm suggest marks of intrinsic value. Contemporary philosophers such as Christine Korsgaard have insightful discussions of intrinsic value. But how do we verify that some specific thing really is intrinsically valuable? I propose a natural way to test for intrinsic value: first, strip the candidate bare of all considerations of good consequences; and, second, see if what remains is still a good thing. I argue that we, as ordinary human beings, have (...)
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  18. added 2019-11-09
    Non-Repeatable Hedonism Is False.Travis Timmerman & Felipe Pereira - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6:697-705.
    In a series of recent papers, Ben Bramble defends a version of hedonism which holds that purely repetitious pleasures add no value to one’s life (i.e. Non-Repeatable Hedonism). In this paper, we pose a dilemma for Non-Repeatable Hedonism. We argue that it is either committed both to a deeply implausible asymmetry between how pleasures and pains affect a person’s well-being and to deeply implausible claims about how to maximize well-being, or is committed to the claim that a life of eternal (...)
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  19. added 2019-11-08
    Consequentialism, Animal Ethics, and the Value of Valuing.Timothy Perrine - forthcoming - Journal of Applied Philosophy.
    Peter Singer argues, on consequentialist grounds, that individuals ought to be vegetarian. Many have pressed, in response, a causal impotence objection to Singer’s argument: any individual person’s refraining from purchasing and consuming animal products will not have an important effect on contemporary farming practices. In this paper, I sketch a Singer-inspired consequentialist argument for vegetarianism that avoids this objection. The basic idea is that, for agents who are aware of the origins of their food, continuing to consume animal products is (...)
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  20. added 2019-10-19
    Hsiao on the Moral Status of Animals: Two Simple Responses.Timothy Perrine - 2019 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 32 (5):927-933.
    According to a common view, animals have moral status. Further, a standard defense of this view is the Argument from Consciousness: animals have moral status because they are conscious and can experience pain and it would be bad were they to experience pain. In a series of papers :277–291, 2015a, J Agric Environ Ethics 28:11270–1138, 2015b, J Agric Environ Ethics 30:37–54, 2017), Timothy Hsiao claims that animals do not have moral status and criticizes the Argument from Consciousness. This short paper (...)
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  21. added 2019-09-25
    A Unified Theory Of Intrinsic Value.Stephen Kershnar - 2007 - Reason Papers 29:19-40.
    There is a series of candidates for the ground of intrinsic value. Different theories posit that the ground consists of some or all of the following: types of experiences, desire-satisfaction, virtue, meaningful relationships, true beliefs, desert-satisfaction, etc. The ground can be local or global depending on whether it grounds value of a spatial, temporal, or fact-specific part of the universe (e.g., Jones enjoying this ice cream) or all facts considered (e.g., the universe over time). In this paper, I argue that (...)
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  22. added 2019-09-22
    Od plurality indivíduí k pluralitnému indivíduu: variant estetiky existencie.Lukáš Švihura - 2017 - In Oľga Sisáková (ed.), Umenie života vo filozofickej reflexii. Prešov, Slovensko: pp. 111-123.
  23. added 2019-09-13
    Rational Choice and the Transitivity of Betterness.Toby Handfield - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):584-604.
    If A is better than B and B is better than C, then A is better than C, right? Larry Temkin and Stuart Rachels say: No! Betterness is nontransitive, they claim. In this paper, I discuss the central type of argument advanced by Temkin and Rachels for this radical idea, and argue that, given this view very likely has sceptical implications for practical reason, we would do well to identify alternative responses. I propose one such response, which employs the idea (...)
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  24. added 2019-09-12
    Review: Development and Reasons. [REVIEW]Mark LeBar - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):711 - 719.
    No Abs Richard Kraut’s What is Good and Why is a development and defense of devel-opmentalism. But Kraut’s approach renders problematic the relationship between good-for and reasons for action. One consequence is uncertainty as to how exactly anybody’s good becomes reason-giving for us, given that there is no immediate connection between anyone’s good and reasons for action. A further problem can be seen in trying to identify a basis for thinking we are beings entitled to respect. Finally, Kraut’s work leaves (...)
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  25. added 2019-08-22
    Praktische Argumentationstheorie. Theoretische Grundlagen, praktische Begründung und Regeln wichtiger Argumentationsarten.Christoph Lumer - 1990 - Braunschweig, Germany: Vieweg.
    Das spezifische Ziel von Argumentationen ist nicht einfach, den Adressaten etwas glauben zu machen - dies wäre bloße Rhetorik ﷓, sondern: den Adressaten beim Erkennen der Akzeptabilität (insbesondere der Wahrheit) der These anzuleiten und ihn so zu begründetem Glauben, zu Erkenntnis zu führen. Argumentationen leiten das Erkennen an, indem sie in ihren Argumenten hinreichende Akzeptabilitätsbedingungen der These als erfüllt beurteilen und so den Adressaten implizit auffordern, diese Bedingungen zu überprüfen. Argumentationen sind gültig, wenn sie prinzipiell das Erkennen anleiten können; d. (...)
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  26. added 2019-08-20
    A Fixed-Population Problem for the Person-Affecting Restriction.Jacob M. Nebel - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    According to the person-affecting restriction, one distribution of welfare can be better than another only if there is someone for whom it is better. Extant problems for the person-affecting restriction involve variable-population cases, such as the nonidentity problem, which are notoriously controversial and difficult to resolve. This paper develops a fixed-population problem for the person-affecting restriction. The problem reveals that, in the presence of incommensurable welfare levels, the person-affecting restriction is incompatible with minimal requirements of impartial beneficence even in fixed-population (...)
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  27. added 2019-07-22
    On Liking Aesthetic Value.Keren Gorodeisky - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    According to tradition, aesthetic value is non-contingently connected to a certain feeling of liking or pleasure. Is that true? Two answers are on offer in the field of aesthetics today: 1. The Hedonist answers: Yes, aesthetic value is non-contingently connected to pleasure insofar as this value is constituted and explained by the power of its possessors to please (under standard conditions). 2. The Non-Affectivist answers: No. At best, pleasure is contingently related to aesthetic value. The aim of this paper is (...)
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  28. added 2019-06-06
    Values and Value Judgments: New Perspectives: Dialogue.Stéphane Lemaire - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (1):1-6.
    Research Articles Stéphane Lemaire, Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie, FirstView Article.
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  29. added 2019-06-06
    People and Their Worth: Uniting Process and Axiology.Rem B. Edwards - 2009 - Process Studies 38 (1):43-68.
    This article argues that process philosophy and Hartmanian formal axiology are natural allies that can contribute much to each other. Hartmanian axiology can bring much needed order and clarity to process thought about the definitions of “good,” “better,” and “best,” about what things are intrinsically good, and about the nature and value of unique, enduring, individual persons. Process thought can bring to axiology greater clarity about and emphasis on the relational and temporal features of human selfhood. The nature and significance (...)
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  30. added 2019-06-06
    Tropic of Value.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):389-403.
    The authors of this paper earlier argued that concrete objects, such as things or persons, may have final value, which is not reducible to the value of states of affairs that concern the object in question. Our arguments have been challenged. This paper is an attempt to respond to some of these challenges, viz. those that concern the reducibility issue. The discussion pre-supposes a Brentano-inspired account of value in terms of fitting responses to value bearers. Attention is given to a (...)
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  31. added 2019-06-06
    Mill's Higher Pleasures and the Choice of Character*: Roderick T. Long.Roderick T. Long - 1992 - Utilitas 4 (2):279-297.
    J. S. Mill's distinction between higher and lower pleasures is often thought to conflict with his commitment to psychological and ethical hedonism: if the superiority of higher pleasures is quantitative, then the higher/lower distinction is superfluous and Mill contradicts himself; if the superiority of higher pleasures is not quantitative, then Mill's hedonism is compromised.
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  32. added 2019-06-06
    Axiology as the Form of Purity of Heart: A Reading Husserliana XXVIII.James G. Hart - 1990 - Philosophy Today 34 (3):206-221.
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  33. added 2019-06-05
    David Ross, Ideal Utilitarianism, and the Intrinsic Value of Acts.Francesco Orsi - 2012 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 1 (2).
    The denial of the intrinsic value of acts apart from both motives and consequences lies at the heart of Ross’s deontology and his opposition to ideal utilitarianism. Moreover, the claim that acts can have intrinsic value is a staple element of early and contemporary attempts to “consequentialise” all of morality. I first show why Ross’s denial is relevant both for his philosophy and for current debates. Then I consider and reject as inconclusive some of Ross’s explicit and implicit motivations for (...)
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  34. added 2019-06-04
    Dissolving the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem.Richard Rowland - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1455-1474.
    According to fitting-attitude (FA) accounts of value, X is of final value if and only if there are reasons for us to have a certain pro-attitude towards it. FA accounts supposedly face the wrong kind of reason (WKR) problem. The WKR problem is the problem of revising FA accounts to exclude so called wrong kind of reasons. And wrong kind of reasons are reasons for us to have certain pro-attitudes towards things that are not of value. I argue that the (...)
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  35. added 2019-05-02
    Freedom and Friendship in Axel Honneth’s Freedom’s Right.Sebastian Muders & Philipp Schwind - 2017 - Filozofija I Društvo 28 (3):454-474.
    In Axel Honneths Recht der Freiheit (RF) dienen persönliche Beziehungen, zu welchen Honneth neben Familien- und Liebesbeziehungen auch die Freundschaft zählt, der Verwirklichung einer „besondere[n], schwer zu charakterisierende[n] Form von Freiheit“ (RF 233). Diese Behauptung fügt sich ein in die Kernthese des Rechts der Freiheit. Demnach vermochte es die „Freiheit im Sinne der Autonomie des Einzelnen“ innerhalb unzähliger „Vorstellung[en] vom Guten“ als einzige, die moderne Gesellschaft nachhaltig zu prägen, wohingegen alle anderen Werte, die in der Moderne wirkmächtig geworden sind, als (...)
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  36. added 2019-04-26
    Aksioidentity as a Determinant of Vocational Training for a Future Psychologist.Valentina Voloshyna - 2018 - Psychology and Psychosocial Interventions 1:31-35.
    The article presents the results of a theoretical and empirical study of the process of development of the axiological identity of a future psychologist in the process of his/her professional training in a higher educational institution. The article substantiates the necessity to use the technology of forming the axiological identity of a future psychologist in the process of professional training as a structural component of his/her integral professional value. The axiological identity of a future psychologist is characterized by the integration (...)
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  37. added 2019-04-18
    Ontological Axiology in Nikolai Lossky, Max Scheler, and Nicolai Hartmann.Frederic Tremblay - 2019 - In Moritz Kalckreuth, Gregor Schmieg & Friedrich Hausen (eds.), Nicolai Hartmanns Neue Ontologie und die Philosophische Anthropologie: Menschliches Leben in Natur und Geist. Berlin, Germany: pp. 193-232.
    The prominent Russian philosopher Nikolai Lossky and his ex-student Nicolai Hartmann shared many metaphysical and epistemological views, and Lossky is likely to have influenced Hartmann in adopting several of them. But, in the case of axiological issues, it appears that Lossky also borrowed from the axiologies of Hartmann and the latter's Cologne colleague, Max Scheler. The links between the theories of values of Scheler and Hartmann have been studied abundantly, but never in relation to Lossky. In this paper, I examine (...)
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  38. added 2019-04-18
    Max Scheler †.Frederic Tremblay & Nicolai Hartmann - 2019 - In Moritz Kalckreuth, Gregor Schmieg & Friedrich Hausen (eds.), Nicolai Hartmanns Neue Ontologie und die Philosophische Anthropologie: Menschliches Leben in Natur und Geist. Berlin, Germany: pp. 263-271.
    This is a translation of the obituary that Nicolai Hartmann wrote for his colleague and friend, Max Scheler, after the latter's premature death in 1928. In this eulogy, after emphasizing the unfortunate incompleteness of Scheler's lifework, his keeping abreast with the development of the various sciences, his power of intuition, and the fact that he was a philosopher of life without for that matter having a Lebensphilosophie, Hartmann chronologically recapitulates Scheler's life achievements, beginning with his career in Jena, his interest (...)
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  39. added 2019-04-02
    A Patch to the Possibility Part of Gödel’s Ontological Proof.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2020 - Analysis 80 (2):229-240.
    Kurt Gödel’s version of the Ontological Proof derives rather than assumes the crucial Possibility Claim: the claim that it is possible that something God-like exists. Gödel’s derivation starts off with a proof of the Possible Instantiation of the Positive: the principle that, if a property is positive, it is possible that there exists something that has that property. I argue that Gödel’s proof of this principle relies on some implausible axiological assumptions but it can be patched so that it only (...)
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  40. added 2019-03-08
    Overpopulation and the Quality of Life.Derek Parfit - 1986 - In Peter Singer (ed.), Applied Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 145-164.
    How many people should there be? Can there be overpopulation: too many people living? I shall present a puzzling argument about these questions, show how this argument can be strengthened, then sketch a possible reply.
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  41. added 2019-03-06
    Between Values and the World: Studies in Second-Order Value Theory.Andrés Garcia - 2018 - Dissertation, Lund
    Value is an inescapable part of the human experience and what life must be like for a conscious and feeling person. Philosophical questions about value are therefore naturally invited: What sort of thing would value be if it were part of the furniture of the world? How should we understand the relations that value is thought to stand in to other things? In a broad sense, these are formal questions calling for philosophical studies into the understanding of value notions. The (...)
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  42. added 2019-01-23
    Population Axiology and the Possibility of a Fourth Category of Absolute Value.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2020 - Economics and Philosophy 36 (1):81-110.
    Critical-Range Utilitarianism is a variant of Total Utilitarianism which can avoid both the Repugnant Conclusion and the Sadistic Conclusion in population ethics. Yet Standard Critical-Range Utilitarianism entails the Weak Sadistic Conclusion, that is, it entails that each population consisting of lives at a bad well-being level is not worse than some population consisting of lives at a good well-being level. In this paper, I defend a version of Critical-Range Utilitarianism which does not entail the Weak Sadistic Conclusion. This is made (...)
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  43. added 2018-12-23
    The Social Cost of Carbon: Valuing Inequality, Risk, and Population for Climate Policy.Marc Fleurbaey, Maddalena Ferranna, Mark Budolfson, Francis Dennig, Kian Mintz-Woo, Robert Socolow, Dean Spears & Stéphane Zuber - 2019 - The Monist 102 (1):84-109.
    We analyze the role of ethical values in the determination of the social cost of carbon, arguing that the familiar debate about discounting is too narrow. Other ethical issues are equally important to computing the social cost of carbon, and we highlight inequality, risk, and population ethics. Although the usual approach, in the economics of cost-benefit analysis for climate policy, is confined to a utilitarian axiology, the methodology of the social cost of carbon is rather flexible and can be expanded (...)
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  44. added 2018-12-06
    Two Kinds of Value Pluralism.Miles Tucker - 2016 - Utilitas 28 (3):333-346.
    I argue that there are two distinct views called ‘value pluralism’ in contemporary axiology, but that these positions have not been properly distinguished. The first kind of pluralism, weak pluralism, is the view philosophers have in mind when they say that there are many things that are valuable. It is also the kind of pluralism that philosophers like Moore, Brentano and Chisholm were interested in. The second kind of pluralism, strong pluralism, is the view philosophers have in mind when they (...)
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  45. added 2018-12-02
    Los valores en la filosofía latinoamericana del siglo XX.José Ramón Fabelo Corzo - 2011 - In Ana Cristina Ramirez (ed.), Filosofía Desde América: Temas, Balances y Perspectivas: (Simposio Del Ica 53). Quito, Ecuador: Abya Yala, Universidad Politécnica Salesiana. pp. 45-83.
    En el trabajo se hace un recorrido por los principales autores latinoamericanos que trabajan el tema de los valores en el siglo XX. Se trata de apresar algunas regularidades generales en el itinerario del pensamiento axiológico en América Latina durante la pasada centuria.
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  46. added 2018-11-16
    From an Axiological Standpoint.Miles Tucker - 2019 - Ratio 32 (2):131-138.
    I maintain that intrinsic value is the fundamental concept of axiology. Many contemporary philosophers disagree; they say the proper object of value theory is final value. I examine three accounts of the nature of final value: the first claims that final value is non‐instrumental value; the second claims that final value is the value a thing has as an end; the third claims that final value is ultimate or non‐derivative value. In each case, I argue that the concept of final (...)
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  47. added 2018-10-05
    Nécessaire sagesse? Essai sur l'assignation des valeurs.Daniel Schulthess - 1988 - Studia Philosophica 47:87-97.
    The article deals with the problem of the so-called “axiological neutrality” which characterizes modern science. Starting from a psychological conception of intrinsic value as that which is perceived worth being pursued, the author first shows that science can study values only indirectly. There are two senses in which science must remain axiologically neutral: on the one hand, it must avoid all ontological evaluation of its objects (ontological neutrality); on the other hand, it must keep separate the evaluation of its results (...)
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  48. added 2018-09-09
    Goodness: Attributive and Predicative.Michael-John Turp - 2016 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 11 (2-3):70-87.
    Michael-John Turp | : There is little consensus concerning the truth or reference conditions for evaluative terms such as “good” and “bad.” In his paper “Good and Evil,” Geach proposed that we distinguish between attributive and predicative uses of “good.” Foot, Thomson, Kraut, and others have put this distinction to use when discussing basic questions of value theory. In §§1-2, I outline Geach’s proposal and argue that attributive evaluation depends on a prior grasp of the kind of thing that is (...)
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  49. added 2018-08-28
    Succeeding Competently: Towards an Anti-Luck Condition for Achievement.Hasko von Kriegstein - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):394-418.
    ABSTRACTAchievements are among the things that make a life good. Assessing the plausibility of this intuitive claim requires an account of the nature of achievements. One necessary condition for achievement appears to be that the achieving agent acted competently, i.e. was not just lucky. I begin by critically assessing existing accounts of anti-luck conditions for achievements in both the ethics and epistemology literature. My own proposal is that a goal is reached competently, only if the actions of the would-be-achiever make (...)
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  50. added 2018-06-21
    Avant-propos : Contrats de partenariat public privé (2018) par Pascal Mukonde Musulay ISBN 978-2-88931-244-3.Ignace Haaz - 2018 - Globethics African Law Series No. 5.
    Le présent ouvrage fait suite aux deux précédents volumes de l’auteur : (2015) Droit des affaires en Afrique subsaharienne et économie planétaire, et (2016) : Démocratie électorale en Afrique subsaharienne Entre droit, pouvoir et argent, publiés par les Éditions Globethics. Bien que Pascal Mukonde convoque le thème du contrat du point de vue strictement juridique et dans le contexte du droit africain en RD. Congo, sur une ligne de recherche systématique (p.75), nous souhaitons mentionner comme préliminaire, la place de l’éthique (...)
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