The Permanent Self: How Many Attacks Can It Endure?

Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research:1-15 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

In this paper, we test the philosophical endurance of the Nyāya theory of the permanent self. We present a debate between those, who believe in a permanent self, and their opponents in a dialogical form. In our imaginary debate, there are two participants; Gautama—somebody who has studied Udayana’s Ātmatattvaviveka (a text that claims that a self must be a permanent and irreducible entity) and finds its arguments convincing—and, Sugata, who does not believe in a permanent and irreducible self. Although Udayana and other philosophers of the Old Nyāya school were mostly fighting the Buddhist philosophers, Sugata’s arguments are not confined to the Buddhist theories only; he presents several reductionist arguments proposed by Hume, Galen Strawson and Parfit.

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References found in this work

Why We Should Reject S.Derek Parfit - 1984 - In Reasons and Persons. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Selves: an essay in revisionary metaphysics.Galen Strawson - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Nyāya critique of the Buddhist doctrine of non-soul.Bimal Krishna Matilal - 1989 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 17 (1):61-79.

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