Pandemic Rule-Breakers, Moral Luck, and Blaming the Blameworthy

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 32 (1):41-47 (2023)
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This paper takes under consideration a piece by Roger Crisp in which he questions what the problem of moral luck can teach us about COVID-19 lockdown rule-breakers. Taking the position that although such rule-breakers might seem to be new examples of moral luck, Crisp ends up denying the existence of moral luck and argues that moral luck is an outdated notion in so far as it relies on other questionable aspects of morality, that is, retributivist punishment and blame. Although the author agrees with Crisp that pandemic rule-breaker cases are putative examples of resultant moral luck, he proposes that Crisp has misconstrued what moral luck is and the paper examines in detail what he sees as the numerous problems with Crisp’s claims. The author concludes that Crisp’s analysis of pandemic rule-breaking does not shed any new light on the moral luck debate, and the difficult questions of luck, moral responsibility, and desert are not so easily resolved.

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Jesse Hill
Lingnan University

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References found in this work

Mortal Questions.Thomas Nagel - 1983 - Religious Studies 19 (1):96-99.
Moral Luck as Moral Lack of Control.Mark B. Anderson - 2019 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):5-29.
Moral and Epistemic Luck.Andrew Latus - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Research 25:149-172.
Taking the blame: appropriate responses to medical error.Daniel W. Tigard - 2019 - Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (2):101-105.

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