Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1146-1159 (2005)
Philosophically, one of the most important questions in the enterprise termed confirmation theory is this: Why should one stick to well confirmed theories rather than to any other theories? This paper discusses the answers to this question one gets from absolute and incremental Bayesian confirmation theory. According to absolute confirmation, one should accept ''absolutely well confirmed'' theories, because absolute confirmation takes one to true theories. An examination of two popular measures of incremental confirmation suggests the view that one should stick to incrementally well confirmed theories, because incremental confirmation takes one to (the most) informative (among all) true theories. However, incremental confirmation does not further this goal in general. I close by presenting a necessary and sufficient condition for revealing the confirmational structure in almost every world when presented separating data.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
The Problem of Measure Sensitivity Redux.Peter Brössel - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (3):378-397.
Milne's Argument for the Log‐Ratio Measure.Franz Huber - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (4):413-420.
Bayesian Confirmation: A Means with No End.Peter Brössel & Franz Huber - 2014 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (4):axu004.
Information as a Probabilistic Difference Maker.Andrea Scarantino - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):419-443.
Similar books and articles
Theories and the Transitivity of Confirmation.Mary Hesse - 1970 - Philosophy of Science 37 (1):50-63.
Confirmation Theory.James Hawthorne - 2011 - In Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Malcolm Forster (eds.), Philosophy of Statistics, Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Volume 7. Elsevier.
The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity.Branden Fitelson - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (3):378.
Theoretical Functions, Theory and Evidence.John Forge - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (3):443-463.
The Logic of Confirmation and Theory Assessment.Franz Huber - 2005 - In L. Behounek & M. Bilkova (eds.), The Logica Yearbook. Filosofia.
Belief and the Incremental Confirmation of One Hypothesis Relative to Another.Andre Mirabelli - 1978 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1978:287 - 301.
From Relative Confirmation to Real Confirmation.Aron Edidin - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (2):265-271.
“For Unto Every One That Hath Shall Be Given”. Matthew Properties for Incremental Confirmation.Roberto Festa - 2012 - Synthese 184 (1):89-100.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads150 ( #31,321 of 2,169,997 )
Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #38,475 of 2,169,997 )
How can I increase my downloads?