Why higher-order vagueness is a pseudo-problem

Mind 103 (409):35-41 (1994)
Difficulties in arriving at an adequate conception of vagueness have led many writers to describe a phenomenon that has come to be known as "higher-order vagueness". Almost as many have found it to be a problem that needs to be addressed. In what follows I shall argue that, whilst we must acknowledge its presence, it is a pseudo-problem. The crucial point is the vagueness of "vague", which shows the phenomenon to be unproblematic though real enough.
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DOI 10.1093/mind/103.409.35
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The Impossibility of Vagueness.Kit Fine - 2008 - Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):111-136.
Indeterminate Truth.Patrick Greenough - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):213-241.
‘Vague’ at Higher Orders.Ivan Hu - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):1189-1216.

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