Why higher-order vagueness is a pseudo-problem

Mind 103 (409):35-41 (1994)
Difficulties in arriving at an adequate conception of vagueness have led many writers to describe a phenomenon that has come to be known as "higher-order vagueness". Almost as many have found it to be a problem that needs to be addressed. In what follows I shall argue that, whilst we must acknowledge its presence, it is a pseudo-problem. The crucial point is the vagueness of "vague", which shows the phenomenon to be unproblematic though real enough.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/mind/103.409.35
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 24,479
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Kit Fine (2008). The Impossibility of Vagueness. Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):111-136.
Patrick Greenough (2008). Indeterminate Truth. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):213-241.
Matti Eklund (2007). Characterizing Vagueness. Philosophy Compass 2 (6):896–909.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

310 ( #8,513 of 1,925,594 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

41 ( #8,852 of 1,925,594 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.