Avoiding Perennial Mind-Body Problems

Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (9-10):111-133 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Russell argued that we can’t know what brains are really like behind our perceptions of them, so minds can conceivably reside in brains. Physicalist-leaning Russellians from Feigl to Strawson try to avoid physicalist and dualist issues with this Russellian idea. Strawson also tries to avoid emergentist issues through panpsychism. Yet critics feel that these Russellians don’t really avoid these issues, but just recast them in new forms. For example, dualist issues arguably remain because it’s hard to see how private pains or colors can reside in solid, grainy, publicly observable brains. Emergence issues arguably remain because panpsychism seems equally unclear as emergentism about how minds arise from brains. This paper revises Strawson and Feigl, while building on recent progress in defusing panpsychism’s emergence issues. It tries to intelligibly formulate Russell’s idea so as to avoid the perennial issues in Russellian and non-Russellian theories, without raising new issues of its own.



External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Panpsychism and Neutral Monism: How to make up One's Mind.Sam Coleman - 2016 - In Jaskolla Brüntrup (ed.), Panpsychism. Oxford University Press.
How To Make Mind-Brain Relations Clear.Mostyn W. Jones - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (5-6):135-160.
Mind-body, body-mind: Two distinct problems.Benny Shanon - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):697 – 701.
The Mind-Body Problem and Whitehead’s Nonreductive Monism.Anderson Weekes - 2012 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (9-10):40-66.
Neuroelectrical approaches to binding problems.Mostyn W. Jones - 2016 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 2 (37).
Crane on the Mind-Body Problem and Emergence.Olga Markić - 2004 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):199-205.
Some crucial issues of mind-body monism.Herbert Feigl - 1971 - Synthese 22 (3-4):295-312.
Kant and Collingwood on the Mind-Body Problem.Katie Harrington - 2013 - Collingwood and British Idealism Studies 19 (1):95-111.


Added to PP

374 (#46,742)

6 months
57 (#67,850)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Mostyn W. Jones
University of Manchester (PhD)

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references