No Justification for Lottery Losers

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (2):205-217 (2014)
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Abstract

Igor Douven has recently developed a challenge for accounts of justification according to which beliefs about lottery losers are never justified. This article argues that champions of such accounts can rise to Douven's challenge and, what's more, that they can turn Douven's argument around in the sense that they can legitimately take it to provide a vindication of their preferred view.

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Christoph Kelp
University of Glasgow

Citations of this work

Lotteries and justification.Christoph Kelp - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1233-1244.
Strong knowledge, weak belief?Moritz Schulz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8741-8753.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Defeasible Reasoning.John L. Pollock - 1987 - Cognitive Science 11 (4):481-518.
A new argument for evidentialism.Nishi Shah - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.
Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.

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