Radically Insensitive Theists

Religious Studies 55 (2):169-188 (2019)
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Abstract

Sceptical theists attempt to meet the challenge to theism posed by evidential arguments from evil by appealing to the limitations of human cognition. Drawing on an exchange between William Rowe and Michael Bergmann, I argue that consistent sceptical theists must be radically insensitive to certain kinds of evidence about prima facie evils – that is, that they must endorse the claim that not even evidence of extreme and pervasive suffering could justify disbelief in theism. I show that Bergmann's attempt to respond to this problem does not succeed and argue that no alternative response is forthcoming, concluding that the threat of radical insensitivity constitutes a serious and underappreciated difficulty for sceptical theism.

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Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini
Rutgers University - Newark

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References found in this work

Belief and the Will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (5):235-256.
Distorted Reflection.Rachael Briggs - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):59-85.
Skeptical Theism.Justin McBrayer - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (7):611-623.
Sceptical Theism and Evidential Arguments From Evil.Michael J. Almeida & Graham Oppy - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):496 – 516.

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