Authors
Ole Koksvik
Australian National University (PhD)
Abstract
A simple reductive view of intuition holds that intuition is a type of belief. That an agent who intuits that p sometimes believes that p is false is often thought to demonstrate that the simple reductive view is false. I show that this argument is inconclusive, but also that an argument for the same conclusion can be rebuilt using the notion of rational criticisability. I then use that notion to argue that perception is also not reducible to belief, and that neither intuition nor perception is reducible to credence.
Keywords intuition  rational criticisability
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Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
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The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.

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