Two conceptions of happiness

Philosophical Review 88 (2):167-197 (1979)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I argue that the many similarities between what aristotle says about "eudaimonia" and what we say about happiness justify the traditional translation of "eudaimonia" as "happiness." it is not widely realized that "eudaimonia" involves a psychological state much like the one we call "happiness." nor is it generally recognized that both "eudaimonia" and "happiness" involve a standard for evaluating lives. For aristotle, The standard is objective and inflexible; for us, It is subjective and flexible. Thus, When we call someone happy and aristotle says he is not "eudaimon", We are not using two different concepts, But rather two different ways of evaluating lives

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,612

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
535 (#36,183)

6 months
34 (#119,795)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Richard Kraut
Northwestern University

Citations of this work

The Good in Happiness.Jonathan Phillips, Sven Nyholm & Shen-yi Liao - 2014 - In Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume 1. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 253–293.
Well-Being Policy: What Standard of Well-Being?Daniel M. Haybron & Valerie Tiberius - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (4):712--733.
In defense of adaptive preferences.Donald W. Bruckner - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):307 - 324.

View all 66 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references