Theory and Decision 21 (2):155-161 (1986)

Abstract
This paper is a first attempt to study the problem of aggregation of individual ordinal probabilistic beliefs in an Arrowian framework. We exhibit some properties an aggregation rule must fulfil; in particular we prove the existence of a “quasi-dictator”
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DOI 10.1007/BF00127192
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References found in this work BETA

The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
Social Choice and Individual Values.Irving M. Copi - 1952 - Science and Society 16 (2):181-181.

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Choosers as Extension Axioms.Bora Erdamar & M. Remzi Sanver - 2009 - Theory and Decision 67 (4):375-384.

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