Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (2):218-224 (2008)
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Abstract |
We introduce an epistemic theory of truth according to which the same rational degree of belief is assigned to Tr(. It is shown that if epistemic probability measures are only demanded to be finitely additive (but not necessarily σ-additive), then such a theory is consistent even for object languages that contain their own truth predicate. As the proof of this result indicates, the theory can also be interpreted as deriving from a quantitative version of the Revision Theory of Truth
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DOI | 10.1017/S1755020308080167 |
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References found in this work BETA
Bayes or Bust?: A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory.John Earman - 1992 - MIT Press.
Der wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten sprachen.Alfred Tarski - 1936 - Studia Philosophica 1:261--405.
View all 14 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Guest Editors’ Introduction.Riccardo Bruni & Shawn Standefer - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):1-9.
Limits in the Revision Theory: More Than Just Definite Verdicts.Catrin Campbell-Moore - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):11-35.
Probability for the Revision Theory of Truth.Catrin Campbell-Moore, Leon Horsten & Hannes Leitgeb - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):87-112.
How to Express Self-Referential Probability. A Kripkean Proposal.Catrin Campbell-Moore - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (4):680-704.
View all 7 citations / Add more citations
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