Philosophy of Science Association 1982:627 - 643 (1982)
Two naturalistic explications of propositional attitudes and their contents are distinguished: the language of thought based theory, on which beliefs are relations to sentences in the language of thought; and the propositional attitude based theory, on which beliefs are functional states of a functional system that does not imply a language of thought, although consistent with it. The latter theory depends on interpersonally ascribable conceptual roles; if these are not available, the language of thought theory has the advantage. But the propositional attitude based theory explains intentionality and conceptual structure as well as the language of thought based theory, and it has two further advantages. First, it does not make the existence of beliefs and desires depend on the language of thought hypothesis. Secondly, its employment of interpersonally ascribable conceptual roles permits a theory of truth conditions to meet certain desiderata, such as a social basis for truth conditions, and a realist conception of truth
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Truth in V for Ǝ ∀∀-Sentences Is Decidable.D. Bellé & F. Parlamento - 2006 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 71 (4):1200 - 1222.
A Reply to Brian Loar's "Must Beliefs Be Sentences?".Jerry Fodor - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:644 - 653.
Supervaluations and the Propositional Attitude Constraint.J. A. Burgess - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (1):103-119.
Inferential Role and the Ideal of Deductive Logic.Thomas Hofweber - 2010 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5 (1).
Supposition and Truth in Ockham's Mental Language.Mikko Yrjönsuuri - 1997 - Topoi 16 (1):15-25.
Beliefs and Concepts: Comments on Brian Loar, "Must Beliefs Be Sentences?".Gilbert Harman - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:654 - 661.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads47 ( #111,400 of 2,172,025 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #173,295 of 2,172,025 )
How can I increase my downloads?