Perception, Mind-Independence, and Berkeley


I discuss a thesis that I call ‘The Appearance of Mind-Independence’, to the effect that, to the subject of an ordinary perceptual experience, it seems that the experience involves the awareness of a mind-independent world. Although this thesis appears to be very widely accepted, I argue that it is open to serious challenge. Whether such a challenge can be maintained is especially relevant to the assessment of any theory, such as Berkeley’s idealism, according to which the only objects of which we are aware in perception are mind-dependent. But the issue is of significance for the philosophy of perception more generally. In the course of my sceptical discussion, I argue that recent work by Campbell and Cassam may be flawed by a failure to take sufficiently seriously the requirements for genuine mind-independence.

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Penelope Mackie
Nottingham University

References found in this work

Which Properties Are Represented in Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2005 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 481--503.

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Citations of this work

The Problem of Perception.Tim Crane & Craig French - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Humean Idealism.Daniel Kodaj - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
Sensing Mind-Independence.Ivan V. Ivanov - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14931-14949.
Perception of Continued Existence Unperceived.Bill Brewer - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):24-38.

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