Intentional Action in Folk Psychology

In Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Oxford, UK: Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 357–365 (2010)
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Abstract

This chapter contains sections titled: What Intentional Action Is The Folk Concept of Intentionality Development The Judgment Process Intentionality and Moral Judgment Explanations of Intentional Action Reason Explanations Causal History of Reason Explanations Enabling Factor Explanations Synopsis References Further reading.

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Keywords

intentional action in folk psychology   intentional action and what it is   consensus in psychology and cognitive science ‐ that the capacity to recognize a behavior as intentional is central component of human social cognition   folk concept of intentionality ‐ philosophical and social–psychological literature, providing theoretical analyses of intentionality   shared folk concept of intentionality   model of folk concept of intentionality   judgment process ‐ modern human life, vast array of intentional actions   motor mirroring ‐ observation triggers the perceiver's own performance of behavior   intentionality and moral judgment ‐ folk concept of intentionality, role in assignment of responsibility and blame   reasons, most frequently used mode of explanation ‐ reflecting core of intentionality concept

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9781444323528   9781405187350

DOI

10.1002/9781444323528.ch45

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Bertram F. Malle
Brown University

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