Manuscrito (4):319-347 (2018)

Authors
Eric Marcus
Auburn University
Abstract
According to one interpretation of Aristotle’s famous thesis, to say that action is the conclusion of practical reasoning is to say that action is itself a judgment about what to do. A central motivation for the thesis is that it suggests a path for understanding the non-observational character of practical knowledge. If actions are judgments, then whatever explains an agent’s knowledge of the relevant judgment can explain her knowledge of the action. I call the approach to action that accepts Aristotle’s thesis so understood Normativism. There are many reasons to doubt Normativism. My aim in this paper is to defend Normativism from a pair of arguments that purport to show that a normative judgment could not constitute an event in material reality and also the knowledge of such a happening. Both highlight a putative mismatch between the natures of, on the one hand, an agent’s knowledge of her normative judgment and, on the other, her knowledge of her own action. According to these objections, knowledge of action includes (a) perceptual knowledge and (b) knowledge of what one has already done. But knowledge of a normative judgment includes neither. Hence knowledge of action cannot simply be knowledge of a normative judgment.
Keywords Practical Knowledge  Anscombe  Memory  Action
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DOI 10.1590/0100-6045.2018.v41n4.em
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References found in this work BETA

Self-Consciousness.Sebastian Rödl - 2007 - Harvard University Press.
Rational Causation.Eric Marcus - 2012 - Harvard University Press.
How Knowledge Works.John Hyman - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):433-451.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Instrumental Rule.Jeremy David Fix - 2020 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (4):444-462.
Wanting and Willing.Eric Marcus - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.

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