Revealing the Beauty behind the Sleeping Beauty Problem


A large number of essays address the Sleeping Beauty problem, which undermines the validity of Bayesian inference and Bas Van Fraassen's 'Reflection Principle'. In this study a straightforward analysis of the problem based on probability theory is presented. The key difference from previous works is that apart from the random experiment imposed by the problem's description, a different one is also considered, in order to negate the confusion on the involved conditional probabilities. The results of the analysis indicate that no inconsistency takes place, whereas both Bayesian inference and 'Reflection Principle' are valid.



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References found in this work

Belief and the Will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (5):235-256.
Sleeping beauty: Reply to Elga.David Lewis - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):171–76.

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