Authors
Conor Mayo-Wilson
University of Washington
Gregory Wheeler
Frankfurt School Of Finance And Management
Abstract
Epistemic decision theory (EDT) employs the mathematical tools of rational choice theory to justify epistemic norms, including probabilism, conditionalization, and the Principal Principle, among others. Practitioners of EDT endorse two theses: (1) epistemic value is distinct from subjective preference, and (2) belief and epistemic value can be numerically quantified. We argue the first thesis, which we call epistemic puritanism, undermines the second.
Keywords Epistemic Utility  Probabilism  Accuracy
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Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
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Truth and Probability.F. Ramsey - 1926 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge. pp. 52-94.

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