Two skeptical arguments or only one?

Philosophical Studies 164 (2):289-300 (2013)
Abstract
The first step in responding to the challenge of external world skepticism is to get clear on the structure of the skeptic’s argument. The most prominent varieties of skeptical arguments either rely on closure principles or underdetermination principles. The relationship between these two sorts of arguments is contentious. Some argue that these arguments can independently motivate skepticism. Others argue that they are really equivalent. I argue that although these two arguments are distinct, their independence is not as obvious as some have thought. The fact that these arguments are not equivalent is important because skeptical arguments that appeal to underdetermination principles cannot be refuted by simply denying closure. So, the strategy for responding to skepticism offered by Nozick/Dretske does not seem an adequate solution
Keywords Skepticism  Underdetermination  Closure  Epistemic justification
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9858-y
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References found in this work BETA
Fred I. Dretske (1970). Epistemic Operators. Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
Roger White (2005). Epistemic Permissiveness. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.

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