Synthese 189 (2):337-352 (2012)
Cartesian skepticism about epistemic justification (‘skepticism’) is the view that many of our beliefs about the external world – e.g., my current belief that I have hands – aren’t justified. I examine the two most influential arguments for skepticism – the Closure Argument and the Underdetermination Argument – from an evidentialist perspective. For both arguments it is clear which premise the anti-skeptic must deny. The Closure Argument, I argue, is the better argument in that its key premise is weaker than the Underdetermination Argument’s key premise. However, it’s also likely that the motivation for accepting both key premises is exactly the same. So there may be a sense in which both arguments provide exactly the same motivation for skepticism. Then I argue that if I I’m right about what the motivation for accepting the arguments’ key premises is, then neither argument succeeds in providing a good reason to accept skepticism. I conclude by explaining why I think epistemologists are right to expend a lot of time and effort on refuting these arguments, even if neither argument provides any motivation for skepticism.
|Keywords||skepticism evidentialism epistemic closure skeptical arguments closure argument underdetermination argument epistemic justification fallibilism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Citations of this work BETA
Intrinsic Interferers and the Epistemology of Dispositions.Sungho Choi - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (1):199-232.
Similar books and articles
Fallibilism, Underdetermination, and Skepticism.Anthony Brueckner - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):384–391.
Two Kinds of Skeptical Argument.Stewart Cohen - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):143 - 159.
Skepticism, Sensitivity, and Closure, or Why the Closure Principle is Irrelevant to External World Skepticism.Adam Leite - 2004 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):335-350.
Reconsidering Closure, Underdetermination, and Infallibilism.Jochen Briesen - 2010 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 80 (1):221-234.
``Critical Notice of Pritchard's E Pistemic Luck &Quot.Jonathan Kvanvig - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77:272-281.
Added to index2010-06-22
Total downloads131 ( #35,862 of 2,158,189 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #38,073 of 2,158,189 )
How can I increase my downloads?