Evidentialism and skeptical arguments
Synthese 189 (2):337-352 (2012)
Abstract
Cartesian skepticism about epistemic justification (‘skepticism’) is the view that many of our beliefs about the external world – e.g., my current belief that I have hands – aren’t justified. I examine the two most influential arguments for skepticism – the Closure Argument and the Underdetermination Argument – from an evidentialist perspective. For both arguments it is clear which premise the anti-skeptic must deny. The Closure Argument, I argue, is the better argument in that its key premise is weaker than the Underdetermination Argument’s key premise. However, it’s also likely that the motivation for accepting both key premises is exactly the same. So there may be a sense in which both arguments provide exactly the same motivation for skepticism. Then I argue that if I I’m right about what the motivation for accepting the arguments’ key premises is, then neither argument succeeds in providing a good reason to accept skepticism. I conclude by explaining why I think epistemologists are right to expend a lot of time and effort on refuting these arguments, even if neither argument provides any motivation for skepticism.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1007/s11229-012-0067-1
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Similar books and articles
Skepticism, sensitivity, and closure, or why the closure principle is irrelevant to external world skepticism.Adam Leite - 2004 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):335-350.
Reconsidering Closure, Underdetermination, and Infallibilism.Jochen Briesen - 2010 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 80 (1):221-234.
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Citations of this work
Closure, Underdetermination, and the Peculiarity of Sceptical Scenarios.Guido Tana - forthcoming - Theoria.
Dreams, Nightmares, and a Defense against Arguments From Evil.Gabriel Citron - 2015 - Faith and Philosophy 32 (3):247-270.
An Argument for External World Skepticism from the Appearance/Reality Distinction.Moti Mizrahi - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (4):368-383.
Intrinsic Interferers and the Epistemology of Dispositions.Sungho Choi - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (1):199-232.