Skepticism, sensitivity, and closure, or why the closure principle is irrelevant to external world skepticism

Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):335-350 (2004)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Is there a plausible argument for external world skepticism? Robert Nozick’s well-known discussion focuses upon arguments which utilize the Sensitivity Requirement and the Closure Principle. Nozick claims, correctly, that no such argument succeeds. But he gets almost all the details wrong. The Sensitivity Requirement and the Closure Principle are compatible; the Sensitivity Requirement is incorrect; and even if true, the Closure Principle is structurally incapable of generating a plausible and valid global skeptical argument. It is therefore a mistake to take the Closure Principle as central in discussions of skepticism. The paper concludes by examining the prospects for a plausible skeptical argument

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 76,419

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Sensitivity, Safety, and Closure.Sven Bernecker - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (4):367-381.
Knowledge and deductive closure.James L. White - 1991 - Synthese 86 (3):409 - 423.
Evidentialism and skeptical arguments.Dylan Dodd - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):337-352.
Two skeptical arguments or only one?Kevin McCain - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):289-300.
Living without closure.Krista Lawlor - 2005 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):25-50.
Knowledge-Closure and Inferential Knowledge.Guido Melchior - 2010 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (3):259-285.
Closure Reconsidered.Yuval Avnur - 2012 - Philosophers' Imprint 12.
No Closure On Skepticism.Yuval Avnur, Anthony Brueckner & Christopher Buford - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):439-447.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-12-22

Downloads
160 (#80,576)

6 months
8 (#105,788)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Adam Leite
Indiana University, Bloomington

Citations of this work

The Self-Knowledge Gambit.Berislav Marušić - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):1977-1999.
Skepticism and epistemic asymmetry.Adam Leite - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):184-197.
My Ordinary Anti-Sceptical Beliefs Are Not Insensitive.Changsheng Lai - 2019 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 14 (3):469-489.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references