Skepticism, sensitivity, and closure, or why the closure principle is irrelevant to external world skepticism

Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):335-350 (2004)
Abstract
Is there a plausible argument for external world skepticism? Robert Nozick’s well-known discussion focuses upon arguments which utilize the Sensitivity Requirement and the Closure Principle. Nozick claims, correctly, that no such argument succeeds. But he gets almost all the details wrong. The Sensitivity Requirement and the Closure Principle are compatible; the Sensitivity Requirement is incorrect; and even if true, the Closure Principle is structurally incapable of generating a plausible and valid global skeptical argument. It is therefore a mistake to take the Closure Principle as central in discussions of skepticism. The paper concludes by examining the prospects for a plausible skeptical argument
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DOI croatjphil2004434
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